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The Ukraine crisis underway since November 2013 is a significant occurrence in a 
greater debate over what norms will prevail in the European—and global—security 
environment. The roots of the crisis lie in two-and-a-half decades of competition for 
influence in Ukraine by the European Union and the Russian Federation. The competition 
between Russia and the EU over Ukraine has evolved significantly since Ukraine became 
independent in 1991. This thesis shows that the European Union’s level of awareness of 
and competition with Russia for influence in Ukraine has significantly grown. Ukraine’s 
position in EU diplomacy has grown from secondary status to being regarded as a critical 
interest across EU institutions and member state governments. While Russian efforts to 
establish dominant influence in Ukraine have also intensified, Moscow’s interest in 
Ukraine has been consistently high. The findings of this thesis indicate that the European 
Union has not given up on Ukraine nor accepted the legitimacy of a Russian “sphere of 
influence” in post-Soviet states. Competition between Russia and the European Union 
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Ukraine’s current prominence is not a fleeting curiosity. Ukrainian territory has 
been influenced by both East and West throughout the centuries. Western Ukraine has 
been historically linked to the Habsburg Empire and Poland, while the eastern provinces 
and Crimea were traditionally part of the Russian Empire.1 The region was the prize of 
Germany’s brief triumph during the Great War. The 1918 treaty of Brest-Litovsk created 
for the first time an independent Ukraine, designed to be a vassal state of the German 
Empire. The independence of Ukraine did not survive long after Germany’s defeat as the 
fledgling Soviet Union seized the opportunity to reassert Moscow’s control over the 
strategic area. Ukraine was among the most vicious battlefields of the Second World 
War. The struggle for control reached such high levels of violence that the lands 
contested by Germany and Russia have been dubbed Europe’s “blood lands.”2 The end of 
the Cold War and Ukraine’s attainment of independence has not signaled the end of the 
region’s allure for the East or the West; these events have merely changed the 
circumstances. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has again loosened Russia’s grip 
on the region while the growth of the European Union has created greater prospects for 
Ukraine to become more integrated with Western Europe than ever before.  
As the European Union expands and Russia reasserts itself, Ukraine has become a 
tantalizing prize in a contest between competing normative, political, and economic 
models. The European Union paradigm includes Ukraine within the broader European 
community, a membership not necessarily defined by formal institutional integration into 
the European Union itself but rather by the establishment of liberal norms, mutually 
compatible legal regimes, and multilateral engagement.3 Russia, meanwhile, regards 
                                                 
1Filippos Proedrou, “Ukraine’s foreign policy: accounting for Ukraine’s Indeterminate stance between 
Russia and the West,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10 no. 4 (2010): 452. 
2Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010): 
viii. 
3Hannes Adomeit, “Russia and its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU,” 
College of Europe Natolin Research Papers (April 2011): 5–6. 
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Ukraine as a region of vital sovereign interest where increasing linkages with the 
European Union can only result in a weakening of Russian influence.4  
This thesis investigates EU and Russian policy in this competition. Specifically, 
the thesis assesses the level of competition between the European Union and Russia over 
Ukraine from an external standpoint as well as how Ukraine has been regarded as an 
object of value internally by Brussels and Moscow. To what extent have the strategies, 
motivations, and levels of competition remained constant or evolved over time? What 
have been the various instruments employed by Moscow and Brussels? What have been 
the effects of the competition on Ukrainian politics and foreign policies? The EU’s 
instruments include democracy promotion and measures designed to deepen economic 
and political cooperation, while Russia’s tools encompass its control over energy 
resources, its military assets, and its ability to gain support from ethnic Russians and 
Russian speakers in Ukraine. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF RUSSIA-EU COMPETITION OVER UKRAINE 
To describe the headline grabbing standoff in Ukraine since November 2013 as 
the result of cartoonish Russian imperialism or nostalgia for the old Soviet days is too 
simple. Both Russian and European Union policies in the Ukraine crisis have been 
shaped by two and a half decades of interaction conducted in the geopolitical landscape 
of former communist regimes. A number of issues are directly relevant. Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity were affirmed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.5 In the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act of 1997, Russia and the NATO allies professed an intention to establish a cooperative 
security environment and constructive dialogue.6 The failure of this environment to 
materialize must be examined. The Kosovo conflict is one major point of friction. The 
                                                 
4Adomeit, “Russia and its Near Neighbourhood,” 65. 
5United Nations Security Council, “Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection With 
Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” United Nations, 19 
December 1994, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/49/765. 
6North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
27 May 1997, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm. 
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European Union has deeply invested both financially and politically in the Balkans, a 
region that Russia regards as part of its sphere of influence.7 The European Union 
countries have asserted that Russia’s behavior in the Balkans and the post-Soviet space, 
and Moscow’s refusal to cooperate in partnership initiatives, represents a lack of 
commitment to the shared security paradigm. Many Russians, meanwhile, regard EU and 
NATO expansion as being aimed directly at the interests of their state.8 The Russian-
Georgian war in 2008 threatened the established precedent of inviolate territorial integrity 
in Europe, and Russia’s behavior in Crimea in 2014 has established a trend in this regard 
that has affected EU-Russian interactions. The competitive trend of EU-Russian relations 
has major significance for Ukraine in particular. 
There is evidence to suggest that Russia views Ukraine as a pivotal arena in a 
contest between Russia and the West. Russians have made an effort to establish a unique 
Eurasian ideology in clear competition with the liberal democratic model favored in 
European Union and NATO nations.9 Strategically, Russians regard international politics 
as a zero sum game and see increased Western influence on their periphery as a limitation 
on their own influence.10 The conviction of ideological superiority and realist power 
politics combine to give Russia strong motivations to establish itself as the most 
influential actor in Ukraine. 
Russia has had a continuous strategic engagement in Ukraine due to its proximity, 
its armaments manufacturers, and the presence of the Black Sea Fleet at the Sevastopol 
naval base. Russia has nevertheless had a low level of institutional linkages with Ukraine. 
Neither the Commonwealth of Independent States nor the proposed Eurasian Economic 
Union has produced significant Russian influence in Ukraine. Russia has preferred to 
deal directly with pro-Kremlin elites. The Crimean annexation and the presence of 
Russian military forces supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine represent a novel 
                                                 
7Mark Webber, “The Kosovo War: A Recapitulation,” International Affairs 85 no.3 (2009): 457. 
8Michael Rühle, NATO Enlargement and Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas (Rome: NATO 
Defense College, 15 May 2014): 1–2. 
9Alexander Lukin, “Eurasian Integration and the Clash of Values,” Survival 56 no.3 (2014): 51–52. 
10David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute For Peace, 2014): 
355. 
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evolution of hard power employment in Russia’s competition for influence.11 The actions 
of Russian military forces in Ukraine since February 2014 have escalated the competition 
to a new level and may represent a shift in Moscow’s desired endgame in Ukraine. 
Moscow’s interest in protecting Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians outside Russia’s 
borders has been asserted by President Putin, most notably in his speech to the Duma on 
the annexation of Crimea.12 There is also ample evidence that Russia intends to establish 
a dominant military position in the post-Soviet space as leverage to prevent any further 
encroachment by the European Union on what it perceives as its legitimate sphere of 
influence. 
The issues examined in this section make an understanding of Ukraine’s role in 
Russian-EU relations highly valuable to policy makers—and indeed to anyone affected 
by European security, economic, or diplomatic developments. The significance of this 
thesis has been underscored by the outbreak of an international crisis in Ukraine 
beginning in November 2013, and escalating with the February 2014 decision by 
President Viktor Yanukovych to leave the country. The crisis continues at the time of this 
writing. Top level officials have already asserted that Russian behavior in Ukraine since 
the crisis began marks a major shift in relations between the West and Russia. Carl Bildt, 
then the Swedish Foreign Minister, wrote in July 2014 that “the invasion, occupation, and 
annexation of Crimea was a clear violation of fundamental principles of European 
security and international law.”13 This sentiment has been echoed by other leaders in the 
EU. European Council President Donald Tusk called Russia “a strategic problem” in 
November 2014, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Russia’s strategy in 
Ukraine called the “entire European peace order into question.”14 This thesis is intended 
                                                 
11Igor Sutyagin, Russian Forces in Ukraine (London: Royal United Services Institute, March 2015): 4. 
12Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” The Kremlin, 18 March 2014, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. 
13Carl Bildt, “Putin’s Credibility Lies Amid the Wreckage of Flight MH17,” Financial Times, July 19, 
2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea355436–0e61–11e4-a1ae-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CySX1lmO. 
14Valentina Pop, “Junker calls Putin’s bluff on South Stream,” Euobserver December 4, 2014, 
http://www.euobserver.com/foreign/126792; Andrew Rettman, “Merkel: Russia cannot veto EU 
expansion,” Euobserver November 17, 2014, http://euobserver.com/foreign/126540. 
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to contribute to an understanding of how the Ukraine crisis has affected the evolution of 
EU-Russian relations and to help illuminate the issues at stake in the continuing crisis. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a plethora of literature dealing with the relationship between the 
European Union and Russia in general, with some works dedicated to how Ukraine 
figures into the diplomatic equation. The literature, as it addresses the full range of 
functions and interactions conducted by states and a supranational institution (the 
European Union), analyzes a wide range of themes, causal factors and trends. However, 
schools of thought regarding EU-Russian competition, and Ukraine’s role in the 
interactions between the EU and Russia, can be parsed out. One school is adamant that 
competition between the European Union and Russia is inevitable, and holds that both 
parties are aggressively seeking to bolster their influence. Another set of experts argues 
that the European Union is not interested in competition with Russia and is willing to 
concede where EU interests conflict with Russian objectives in Ukraine. The literature on 
Ukraine itself is divided between two major positions. One argument is that Ukraine is 
committed to pursuing a pro-Western policy and seeks to deliberately distance itself from 
Russia. The second school argues that Ukraine favors neither the European Union nor 
Russia over the other, and that it has consistently pursued a balanced policy aimed at 
maintaining independence and constructive engagement with both powers.  
A common position in the literature is the assertion that there is an explicit 
competition between the European Union and Russia over Ukraine specifically and the 
post-Soviet space in general.15 Analysts advance several arguments as evidence of overt 
competition. Russia, it is argued, perceives the EU’s liberal norms and institutional creep 
as a concerted effort to block Russian influence in former communist territories.16 In 
response, proponents of the competition position argue that Russian diplomacy in so 
                                                 
15Adomeit,” Russia and its Near Neighbourhood,” 7. 
16Adomeit, “Russia and its Near Neighbourhood,” 19; Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim, “Moscow 
versus Brussels: Rival Integration Projects in the Balkans,” Mediterranean Quarterly 25 no. 2 (Spring 
2014): 70–71; Ioana Reiber, “Geopolitical Games Between Russia and EU: Ukraine and Moldova,” The 
International Annual Scientific Session Strategies XXI (2014), 340–341. 
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called “frozen conflicts” in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space has been designed 
to weaken liberal regimes and prevent the European Union’s values and standards from 
taking root.17 In this interpretation, Russia’s behavior, especially in 2014, is aimed at the 
“strategic denial” of Ukraine to the West, by destabilizing any Ukrainian regime friendly 
to the EU and its norms while positioning Russia to dominate the security situation by 
controlling the pace of conflict.18  
Authors supporting the competition interpretation have identified many instances 
where Russia has leveraged its state power to influence Ukraine. Russian tools include 
CIS treaties, withholding energy supplies to apply political pressure, links between the 
Russian state and pro-Russian political parties, and military intervention.19  
Moscow has also sought to construct a legal narrative that justifies Russian 
intervention and that obstructs the European Union. Examples include the Russian 
position that Yanukovych’s replacement by a new acting President and the subsequent 
election of Petro Poroshenko were illegal steps. Moscow asserts that Crimea has 
legitimately become part of the Russian Federation through a democratic referendum 
process.20 The aim of Russia’s legal narrative is to muddle the issue among potential 
adversaries with strong commitments to adhering to international law and liberal 
norms—chiefly the European Union—and hamper efforts by these states to form a 
consensus opposing Russian behavior.21  
Russia also contends that it has a responsibility to “protect the rights of Russians 
unfortunate enough to live outside the borders of the Russian Federation.”22 Observers 
                                                 
17Blank and Kim, “Moscow versus Brussels,” 63. 
18Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” 
International Affairs 90 no. 6 (2014): 1269–1271. 
19Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance: Interdependence 
with Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s rule transfer in the Ukraine,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 16 no. 6 (2009): 858, 866; Reiber, “Geopolitical Games,” 339; Proedru, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 
451. 
20Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention,” 1260–1262. 
21Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention,” 1259. 
22Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” War on the Rocks October 11, 2014, 4, 
http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/ukraine-and-the-art-of-limited-war/. 
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note that the ethnic dimension of Russian diplomacy often serves as a justification for 
intervention abroad to enhance Moscow’s geopolitical power.23  
The European Union’s drive to compete for Ukraine is seen as motivated 
primarily by economic reasons with a strong normative dimension. The literature 
identifies programs such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern 
Partnership (EAP) as designed to promote economic development and political stability 
with potential partners on the EU periphery.24 EU agreements with Ukraine have 
tightened the mutual economic connections, enabling an increased flow of labor from 
Ukraine to the EU through visa agreements, and an expanded volume of goods through a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).25 Some experts argue that 
these developments constitute evidence of deliberate competition by the EU with Russia 
because the EU-Ukraine agreements are incompatible with the Russian-sponsored CIS 
and Eurasian Union Single Economic Space, and that they are pursued despite vocal 
Russian objections.26 As some commentators observe, the European Union has been 
drawn into competition by Ukraine itself. Demands from Ukraine and other Eastern 
European countries motivated the EU’s creation of the ENP, and the dissatisfaction of 
Ukrainian elites with the ENP process was identified as a driver behind the development 
of the EAP framework.27 
The school of thought discerning a lack of competition between the European 
Union and Russia over Ukraine focuses mainly on a lack of interest, or will, to compete 
by the EU. There is some discussion of conciliatory Russian diplomacy, but in the 
                                                 
23Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention,” 1285; Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” 
4. 
24Alexandra Shapovalova, “Political Implications of the Eastern Partnership for Ukraine: A Basis for 
Rapprochement or Deepening the Rift in Europe,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 10 no. 3 (2010): 
71, 74. 
25Simion Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress, and 
Potential,” European Foreign Affairs Review 16 no. 2 (2011): 267; Peter Havlik, “Vilnius Eastern 
Partnership Summit: Milestone in EU-Russia Relations – Not Just For Ukraine,” Danube Law and 
Economics Review 5 no. 1 (2014): 22. 
26Dimitrova and Dragneva,”Constraining External Governance,” 858; Havlik, “Vilnius Eastern 
Partnership Summit,” 23–25. 
27Shapovalova, “Political Implications,” 76. 
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context of Russia needing to compromise with the EU due to its size and importance as 
an energy market and source of investment, rather than in reference to the EU’s supposed 
unwillingness to compete.28  
In the case of the European Union, however, several propositions are advanced to 
demonstrate an avoidance of competition over Ukraine. A common idea in the literature 
is that the EU carefully designs its engagement with Ukraine to avoid competition with 
Russian interests.29 The EU motivations to do so are attributed to the importance of 
economic and energy links between the EU and Russia, respect for Ukrainian ties to 
Russia, and an unwillingness to create instability that could negatively impact the 
security environment.30  
Another recurrent theme in much of the literature is an empirical argument that 
the EU is not competing with Russia over Ukraine because the EU has never extended 
the possibility of accession to the European Union.31 The EU is unwilling to entertain the 
notion of Ukrainian membership because of concerns that Ukraine does not meet EU 
standards in areas such as human rights, political development, and economic stability.32 
For Ukraine’s part, eventual accession to the European Union is deemed the primary 
motivating factor behind its engagement with the EU.33 Therefore—the argument runs—
the EU’s steadfast refusal to discuss accession reflects an unwillingness to compete 
because it ignores Ukraine’s core interests. 
                                                 
28Adomeit, “Russia and its Near Neighborhood,” 36; Shaplova, “Political Implications,” 75. 
29Shaplova, “Political Implications,” 74; Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations,” 265–266; Richard Youngs, 
“A Door Neither Closed Nor Open: EU Policy Towards Ukraine During and Since the Orange Revolution,” 
International Politics 46 no. 4 (2009): 371. 
30Havlik, “Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit,” 25; Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 366; 
Ostap Odushkin, “The Acceptance of Ukraine to the European Union: Integrating and Disintegrating 
Factors for the EU,” Polish Sociological Review 136 no. 4 (2001): 370. 
31Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 361; Dimitrova and Dragneva “Constraining External 
Governance,” 855. 
32Linas Linkevičius, “The European Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine,” Lithuanian Foreign 
Policy Review 21 (2008): 66; Paul Kubick, “Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine After the Orange 
Revolution,” Democratization 16 no. 2 (2009): 326. 
33Kataryna Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on 
Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 61 no. 2 (2009): 208. 
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The literature on Ukraine and its government’s approach to the European Union 
and Russia includes differing assessments. In some circles it is argued that Ukraine is 
seeking closer ties with the European Union at the expense of Russian influence. 
Arguments to this effect highlight several facts. Ukraine after the Orange Revolution 
aligned politically with the EU on many foreign policy issues, including the Transnistria 
issue, and joined or expanded cooperation with organizations designed to limit Russian 
influence such as the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) Group and 
NATO.34 Other than security assurances offered in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum 
(violated by Russia in 2014), Ukraine has no formal security guarantees and sees deeper 
integration with the West as a way to enhance its security.35 The European Union is also 
a major Ukrainian trade partner, and the EU offers the greatest prospects for growth in 
trade, investment, and employment opportunities for Ukrainian citizens.36 Closer ties 
with the European Union would enable Ukraine to pursue greater economic 
independence from Russia, especially since the CIS has sometimes been used to pressure 
Ukraine into supporting Russian policies.37 
While scholars do not deny that Ukraine has an interest in the European Union 
and has consistently pursued engagement with Brussels, some observers maintain that 
Ukraine since independence has sought to balance relations with the EU and Russia, 
favoring neither.38 The population of Ukraine is ethnically divided. A large ethnic 
Russian minority consists of people that view themselves as Ukrainian citizens while 
looking to Russia for cultural leadership.39 The influential Party of Regions is strongly 
                                                 
34Dimitrova And Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 862; Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign 
Policy,” 449. 
35Reiber, “Geopolitical Games,” 341. 
36Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations,” 267–268; Havlik, “Vilnius Summit Eastern Partnership,” 29–30; 
Linkevičius, “European Neighbourhood Policy,” 68. 
37Odushkin, “Acceptance of Ukraine, 373. Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External 
Governance,” 863. 
38Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 451. 
39Stephen Shulman, “Competing Versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and 
the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine,” Nationalities Papers 26 no. 4(1998): 6. 
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identified with Russia ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and politically, and it receives 
funding from Russia.40  
Aside from the ethnic aspect of the equation, Russia has vital economic 
importance to Ukraine. Many Ukrainian elites have expressed pro-Russian sympathies 
despite their nationality.41 Russia remains Ukraine’s largest trade partner after the 
European Union and an important source of investment. Politically, there is ample 
evidence of Ukraine taking care to placate Russian interests. As early as 2003, Ukraine 
worked to maintain economic ties with Russia, expressing interest in the Russia-
sponsored Single Economic Space.42 Despite the Orange Revolution and the advent of 
the ENP, Ukraine failed to make major political and economic reforms to align with the 
EU model under the ENP.43  
After the tide of pro-Western sentiment evident in the 2004 Orange Revolution 
receded, Ukraine undertook several measures to reassure Russia. The literature highlights 
political developments during the administration of pro-Russian President Viktor 
Yanukovych. In 2006, discussions over Ukraine’s membership in the Single Economic 
Space were reopened.44 After Yanukovych’s election to Ukraine’s presidency in 2010, 
integration progress with the EU under the Eastern Partnership ground to a halt, while 
there was a marked growth in pro-Russian policies, including abandonment of NATO 
aspirations by Ukraine.45 In response to the stick of Russian pressure, and the carrot of a 
Russian gas deal and major loan, Yanukovych abandoned an Association Agreement and 
free trade deal with the EU in November 2013.46 Literature dealing with how the 
resulting crisis may affect Ukrainian intentions to maintain a balance between the EU and 
Russia is comparatively scarce. This thesis seeks to contribute to filling that gap. 
                                                 
40Kubicek. “Problems of Post-Post-Communism,” 333; Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 449, 
452. 
41Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 451. 
42Linkevičius, “European Neighbourhood Policy,” 79. 
43Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Coordination,” 188. 
44Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Coordination,” 201. 
45Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations,” 264–265. 
46Reiber, “Geopolitical Games,” 338. 
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There is little literature that deals specifically with measuring trends in the 
competition over Ukraine and the strategies employed in this rivalry. This thesis makes a 
contribution by identifying these trends and helping to assess how the level of 
competition between the European Union and Russia has changed, and by investigating 
why. There is also little scholarship to date dealing directly with the conflict in Ukraine 
resulting from the 2013 rejection by President Viktor Yanukovych of the EU association 
agreement and how it has affected Russian-EU competition over the country. While at the 
time of this writing the crisis is not resolved, placing the events in the competition since 
November 2013 in context with historical trends may contribute to a more informed 
understanding of current issues. 
C. POTENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMPETITION 
Several defensible hypotheses could be advanced to assess and explain EU-Russia 
competition over Ukraine. Thematically, potential explanations can by broken down into 
two overarching groups. Starting with the hypothesis that the EU and Russia are engaged 
in a competition over Ukraine, one could posit that the levels of competition between 
Brussels and Moscow have remained constant since Ukrainian independence. This 
hypothesis could draw on the consistency demonstrated in Ukrainian expressions of 
interest in EU membership, and Russian consistency in attempting to maintain influence 
in the post-Soviet space. Another subset of this explanatory model could argue that levels 
of competition between the EU and Russia began at a low point following Ukrainian 
independence in 1991, and trended toward increasing intensity through 2014 to the 
present moment. This explanation could be supported through a detailed examination of 
Brussels’ evolving engagement programs with Ukraine. Kiev’s troubled history within 
the CIS, recurrent economic and energy conflicts with Moscow, and the political 
polarization sparked by the annexation of Crimea also contribute to strengthening the 
case for this hypothesis. Increasing Russian efforts to develop an integration model to 
serve as an alternative to the EU, including the CIS, the Single Economic Space, and the 
Eurasian Economic Union, also fit into this argument. 
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The other major explanatory hypothesis argues that the European Union and 
Russia are not engaged in competition over Ukraine. The literature review identified a 
school of interpretation arguing that the European Union is not seeking to bring Kiev into 
its orbit, or to challenge Russian interests in Ukraine. This argument relies on the 
European Union’s historical unwillingness to consider Ukraine a candidate for accession 
to the EU, the “take it or leave it” nature of Brussels’ diplomacy, and an investigation of 
instances in which the EU tempered its engagement with Ukraine to avoid interfering 
with Russian interests. A related hypothesis could posit that Ukraine has moved firmly 
into the Russian sphere of influence, and that therefore the EU is unable to compete. 
Kiev’s susceptibility to Moscow’s pressure in the energy and economic sectors, as well as 
its vulnerability to Russia’s military power and strategy of ethnic politics, fit well within 
this framework. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
Russia and the European Union have taken different paths in their relations with 
Ukraine. The variations in the interests and diplomatic strategies of the EU and Russia 
reflect incongruent levels of competition by the two entities over Ukraine. The European 
Union has evolved from a low level of competition over Ukraine to placing an 
increasingly high priority on securing influence over the country. Russia, meanwhile, has 
consistently had a high interest in competition in order to establish hegemonic influence 
over Ukraine—although the Russian state has not always been as capable of acting on 
that interest as it has been in recent years. Ukraine has historically fueled this competition 
by avoiding irreversible commitment to either the EU or the Russian Federation. Kiev has 
an interest in the economic opportunities, democratic values, and security offered by 
membership in the European Union. Ukraine also has lasting, vital ties to Russia 
stemming from its long time status as a province of the Russian Empire and republic of 
the Soviet Union, as well as a significant ethnic Russian population cementing cultural 
ties to the East.  
Ukraine’s attempt to sustain a balancing act between East and West has 
intensified the competition over time. The Ukraine crisis beginning in November 2013, 
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however, has changed the dynamic by influencing Ukraine to firmly embrace the 
European Union and diminish its links with Russia. This thesis examines the interests, 
strategies, and events that have informed how the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine 
have approached the competition. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized with three major chapters: the European Union-Ukraine 
relationship, the Russia-Ukraine relationship, and an analysis of the competition. Chapter 
II seeks to identify EU interests in Ukraine, the ways in which the EU has interacted with 
Ukraine, and trends in the levels of interest that the EU has demonstrated in Ukraine. 
Special attention is devoted to how the European Union has reacted to Russian activities 
in Ukraine. Chapter III examines Russian interests in Ukraine, the tools Russia leverages 
to exert influence, and how Russian behavior toward Ukraine fits into the broader scope 
of Russian competition with the EU. Chapter IV focuses on Ukraine’s place in the 
broader interactions between the EU and Russia. This chapter includes an analysis of how 
Ukrainian politics and choices have affected the competition between the European 
Union and Russia. The final chapter summarizes the conclusions. 
 14
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 15
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UKRAINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union has an intense interest in expanding markets for its member 
states, as well as promoting the economic prosperity of trade partners throughout the 
world.47 The EU has a major interest in Ukraine as the largest of the Soviet successor 
states—aside from Russia itself—on its border and a major energy corridor.48 Ukraine is 
the European Union’s 24th largest trade partner, while the EU is a close second to Russia 
in trade with Ukraine, making closer relations mutually beneficial for both.49  
The European Union also has an interest in normative engagement with all states 
on its borders.50 The EU promotes democratic values, the rule of law, accountable 
governments, and economic prosperity to ensure the security and stability of its own 
member states. The major engagement incentive for Ukraine, and many of the states on 
the periphery of the European Union, is the prospect of EU membership.51 The carrot of 
membership has permitted the European Union to pursue an engagement strategy of 
conditionality, demanding that bordering states adopt EU norms in exchange for limited 
tangible gains short of accession.  
European Union diplomacy with Ukraine also began as a “take it or leave it” 
approach, reflecting a lack of awareness of Russian ambitions, or an unwillingness to 
compete with Russia for dominant influence in Ukraine. This state of affairs persisted 
until 2004, when the EU’s eastern expansion and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
                                                 
47The institution now known as the European Union originated as the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951. Interest in expanding economic cooperation between member states, and extending 
that cooperation to new members, has played a major role in the EU’s evolution to its current form. 
48Kataryna Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on 
Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 61 no. 2 (2009): 188. 
49Simion Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress, and 
Potential,” European Foreign Affairs Review 16 no. 2 (2011): 268. 
50Alexandra Shapovalova, “Political Implications of the Eastern Partnership for Ukraine: A Basis for 
Rapprochement or Deepening the Rift in Europe,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 10 no. 3 (2010): 
71. 
51Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 855. 
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instigated a shift to a more attentive approach. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, 
European Union policy has steadily evolved toward active attempts to court Ukraine, and 
increased awareness of the need to compete with Russia. This change in policy was not 
without internal controversy. Indeed, as this chapter shows, there has been a significant 
debate within the EU regarding its Ukraine policy since 2004. The overall consensus, 
however, has shifted in favor of competing to promote the European Union’s influence in 
Ukraine. 
B. EARLY ENGAGEMENT 
The European Union’s initial relations with Ukraine established the trend of 
limited engagement that would prevail over the next decade. Following Ukraine’s 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it received no direct attention from the EU. 
The only substantive interaction was a grant equivalent to 120 million euros as part of the 
European Union’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(TACIS) program, which was based in Moscow.52 Relations with Ukraine were so 
disorganized that an official EU delegation did not even open in Kiev until 1993, 
illustrating the low priority assigned to Ukraine at the time.53 Ukraine, however, has long 
been interested in accession to the European Union. President Kuchma, leader of Ukraine 
from 1994 to 2005, frequently expressed support for EU membership and signed a decree 
formalizing that interest as a strategic goal in Luxembourg in 1998.54  
Institutionalized engagement between the European Union and Ukraine grew 
throughout the 1990s, but without any significant increase of interest or active 
competition with Russia by the EU. Negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) were completed in 1994, with full implementation achieved in 1998. 
The PCA represented Ukraine’s first exposure to the EU’s norms, values, and legal 
regime—sometimes referred to as its acquis communautaire.55 Despite taking the step of 
                                                 
52Fredo Arias-King, “The Genesis of the European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Belarus,” 
Demokratizatsiya 14 no.4 (2006): 535.  
53Ibid., 536.  
54Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Cooperation,” 192. 
55Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 855. 
 17
a formal agreement, little progress on advancing relations was achieved by the PCA. The 
agreement lacked incentives from the Ukrainian point of view, in that it required a long 
list of domestic reforms with no promises from the EU in return.56 Despite the lack of 
formal progress toward closer ties as a result of this agreement, the PCA did have long 
term value for EU influence in Ukraine. It established an institutionalized dialogue, 
consistently exposing Ukraine to EU norms and expectations.57 Specialized departments 
for cooperation and adaptation to EU norms were also created within Ukrainian 
government ministries, laying the basic foundation for future integration.58 It was also the 
first PCA achieved with a former republic of the Soviet Union, signaling that Ukraine 
had at least some unique level of significance to the European Union. 
The years following the implementation of the PCA in 1998 and prior to the 
Orange Revolution in 2004 can be seen as a low point in the European Union’s 
competitive approach toward relations with Ukraine. The EU did not invite Ukraine to 
the 1998 European Union Enlargement Conference held in London.59 In 1999 the 
European Union and Ukraine agreed on a Common Strategy aimed at supporting 
Ukraine’s democratic and economic development. This agreement, however, took over 
three years to be officially adopted in Ukraine, and it resulted in no substantial domestic 
reform or diplomatic gains with the European Union.60 During this period domestic 
politics in Ukraine also drove the EU away from a strategy of pursuing closer 
engagement. Endemic corruption in Kuchma’s government, and increasing limitations of 
political freedoms, including intimidation of the press, caused the EU to express 
“profound concerns,” and cut off high level contact between European Union leaders and 
                                                 
56Marek Dabrowski and Svitlana Taran, “The Free Trade Agreement Between the EU and Ukraine: 
Conceptual Background, Economic Context, and Potential Impact,” CASE Network Studies and Analyses 
no. 437 (2012): 16. 
57Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 855. 
58Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Cooperation,” 195. 
59Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (London: Yale University Press, 2009: 290. 
60Paul Kubick, “Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine After the Orange Revolution,” 
Democratization 16 no. 2 (2009): 337. 
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Ukrainian officials.61 The withdrawal of high level political contact by the EU reflected a 
reluctance to continue even the dialogue established by the PCA, let alone compete for an 
increased stake in Ukraine’s development. EU Commission President Romano Prodi 
even “suggested that Ukraine had as much chance of joining the EU as New Zealand.”62 
In sum, prior to 2004 the EU had little interest in Ukrainian accession, preferring to 
proclaim its own norms with the expectation that Ukraine would adapt to them. When 
this outcome did not prevail, as demonstrated with the Kuchma Presidency, the European 
Union was content to withdraw high level contact and await reform. 
C. EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY AND THE ORANGE 
REVOLUTION 
In 2004, the European Union enlarged from fifteen to twenty five states, with 
seven of the new members (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Slovakia) having formerly been members of the Soviet Bloc. In 2004 also 
Ukraine experienced a mass pro-democracy movement known as the Orange Revolution. 
These factors combined to change the diplomatic dynamic between Ukraine and the 
European Union. The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was designed as an 
overarching framework for engagement with all states in the European region not within 
the European Union. The ENP was not directed exclusively at Ukraine, but due to 
Ukraine’s size and importance in Eastern Europe, it became a major object of ENP 
diplomacy.  
An important factor in Ukraine’s early prominence in the ENP framework was the 
presence of the new eastern members of the European Union. Poland was a strong 
advocate of prioritizing Ukrainian interests over Russian concerns in ENP diplomacy, 
and Lithuania sought to leverage the ENP to strengthen a bilateral partnership with 
Ukraine formed in 2002.63  
                                                 
61Richard Youngs, “A Door Neither Closed Nor Open: EU Policy Towards Ukraine During and Since 
the Orange Revolution,” International Politics 46 no. 4 (2009): 360–361. 
62Ibid., 361. 
63Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 362. 
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The ENP and the Orange Revolution were not directly linked, but the 
consequences of the Orange Revolution had a major influence on European Union 
diplomacy thereafter. As the ENP was the centerpiece of EU engagement with Ukraine 
until the introduction of the Eastern Partnership in 2009, an examination of the Orange 
Revolution must precede consideration of the ENP.  
The European Neighborhood Policy was barely off the ground when the mass 
protests that would come to be known as the Orange Revolution began in November 
2004. The Orange Revolution drew the EU toward more overt competition with Russia 
over Ukraine and sparked the first major internal EU debate over policy toward the 
country. The European Union became active in support of Ukraine’s movement toward a 
more accountable and more democratic government. The Commission dispatched 
election observers to support the new rounds of elections that would eventually see 
Yuschenko elected president. Reflecting the new dimension of European Union 
diplomacy brought about by the 2004 enlargement, the majority of observers were 
supplied by Poland and Slovakia. The European Union, via the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), was vocal in support of the power sharing constitutional 
compromise that resolved contention over a new round of elections.  
These overt actions in support of Western-style democracy in Ukraine did not 
come without a debate within the EU. Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom were 
the strongest supporters of the Orange Revolution movement. France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain expressed reservations to various degrees. French and German reluctance was 
based on concern over the implications for EU-Russian relations. The French government 
had no major interest in the Ukrainian question, and the French Foreign Minister at that 
time, Michel Barnier, expressed more concern over regional upheaval than support for 
the demonstrators.64 Germany was in the midst of negotiating a gas deal with Russia, and 
was also slow to support the Orange Revolution. The European Union eventually unified 
in support of the Orange Revolution, but the debate demonstrated the evident concern 
                                                 
64Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 364.  
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over Russian objections. Nevertheless, the European Union officially supported the pro-
Western Orange Revolution despite awareness that it conflicted with Russian interests.65  
Despite the increased interest in Ukrainian affairs demonstrated by EU support for 
the Orange Revolution, the performance of the ENP framework demonstrated a 
continuation of the trend of tentative engagement. The Ukraine-European Union Action 
Plan (AP) developed in February 2005 laid out 73 tasks to be performed with the goal of 
bringing Ukraine into line with EU standards.66 Despite the demanding obligations 
assigned to Ukraine, there were no concrete incentives laid out in return, only nebulous 
promises of closer cooperation, and perhaps eventually integration. As a result, no 
substantial effort was undertaken to codify the requirements of the action plan in 
Ukrainian law.67 Membership in the European Union was a concrete goal of the 
Ukrainian government under both the Kuchma and Yuschenko regimes, but accession 
was not an option on the table within the ENP framework. The unwillingness of 
European Union negotiators to extend this option created a disincentive for Ukrainian 
elites to push legislation to meet the AP tasks.68  
Internal Ukrainian politics also share some responsibility for Ukraine’s slow 
progress with respect to the AP. Ukraine was mired in political conflict between the 
Orange Coalition and Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, and crippled by splits within the 
Orange Coalition itself. The European Union, however, failed to establish motivations for 
Ukraine to show unity and will to accomplish the Action Plan, evidencing the EU’s lack 
of determination to compete for influence in Ukraine.69 Persistent concern over Russian 
perceptions and reactions was in large part responsible for the EU’s hesitancy. Richard 
Youngs argues that  
in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution considerations relating to 
Russia reasserted themselves as the prominent influence over European 
                                                 
65Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 363–366. 
66Wolczuk, “Implementation Without Coordination,” 189. 
67Ibid., 194–197. 
68Kubicek, “Problems of Post-Post-Communism,” 337. 
69Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 451. 
 21
policies. One EU spokesman recognized that policy toward Ukraine was 
‘increasingly caught up in debates over the best way to deal with Russia.’ . 
. . One Commission director admitted that concern over Russian energy 
supplies was the key reason why several member states were ‘slowing 
down’ on relations with Ukraine.70 
While concerns about Russia were not the sole reason for the slow progress 
toward deepening relations with Ukraine through the ENP framework, the European 
Union’s desire to avoid the appearance of competition with Russia constrained Brussels’ 
diplomacy. The ENP framework nonetheless produced some advances in EU-Ukrainian 
relations and evidenced increasing European Union influence in Ukraine. A visa 
agreement was successfully negotiated, easing Ukrainian access to the Schengen Area, 
and perhaps more significantly, finally offering a concrete, if minor, benefit for Ukraine 
derived from its EU relations.71  
The growth of Brussels’ influence has been evident in the foreign policy realm. 
By 2007 Ukraine had adopted 549 out of 589 CFSP declarations and 833 out of 907 
policy statements.72 Ukraine has also contributed to the EU Border Assistance Mission to 
Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), and contributed troops to NATO peacekeeping 
missions.73 The closer alignment between Ukraine and the European Union in foreign 
policy issues is evidence of a significant shift toward the West. More telling in the 
context of EU-Russian competition was the increased attention given by President 
Yuschenko to the GUAM organization, established in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova as “a pole that could stand up to Russia’s domineering 
policies.”74  
All told the ENP era saw the European Union move toward more active influence 
in Ukraine by a matter of degrees. While the ENP resulted in an increased level of 
socialization with the EU and the growth of institutional linkages, the EU was careful to 
                                                 
70Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 371. 
71Simon-Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations,” 267. 
72Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 862. 
73Ibid., 863. 
74Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 449. 
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avoid overtly irritating Russian sensibilities. In 2006 Commission President Manuel 
Barroso explicitly stated that “Ukraine is not ready” for membership.75 The ENP AP did 
establish obligations for Ukraine to meet, as opposed to the non-binding dialogue of the 
PCA. Despite the EU’s continued rejection of the prospect of membership, the events of 
the Orange Revolution and the framework established by the ENP created the foundation 
for deeper EU-Ukrainian relations and more explicit competition with Russia by the 
European Union. 
D. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND THE DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is an effort by the European Union to focus the 
broad goal of normative engagement and limited integration envisioned by the ENP 
toward the unique challenges of specific eastern European states. The evolution of the 
EaP was driven from within the EU by a desire to tailor integration strategies for states in 
the post-Soviet space, and by demands from non-EU Eastern European states for a more 
functional process responsive to their unique situations.76 While the Eastern Partnership 
was conceived as a regional program, Ukraine was the centerpiece of the strategy. 
Consistent with the shift to Eastern-oriented EU activism triggered by the 2004 
enlargement, Poland was the major EU sponsor of the EaP, with the specific goal of 
strengthening relations with Ukraine.77 Designing an integration program centered 
around Ukraine indicated the increasing importance placed on gaining EU influence with 
Kiev. The EaP also held out credible possibilities to achieve major concrete gains for 
Ukraine: an Association Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA). European Union diplomatic language continued to be sensitive to 
Russian perceptions during this period, but nonetheless the policies and negotiations 
within the EaP framework represented intensified EU-Russian competition in Ukraine. 
The DCFTA, negotiated between 2008 and 2011, not only offered significant 
economic opportunity for Ukraine, but also promised to intensify legal and institutional 
                                                 
75Youngs, “Door Neither Closed Nor Open,” 370. 
76Shapovalova, “Political Implications,” 71. 
77Simon Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations,” 262–263. 
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integration in the EU’s Single European Market. The European Union’s experience with 
the enlargement process with its Eastern European states such as Poland indicated that 
countries joining the European Market can expect to experience economic modernization 
and significant growth in foreign direct investment.78 The agreement extended beyond 
the elimination of tariff barriers and would integrate broad swaths of the Ukrainian 
economy into the European Union model, including investment policy, environmental 
regulations, competition rules, and dispute resolution.79  
Politically, the implementation of the EU acquis communautaire would have 
created significant linkages between EU institutions and the Ukrainian ministries 
governing transportation, trade, energy, and justice.80 The Association Agreement under 
negotiation through the EaP also promised to further reduce visa barriers and access to 
various EU-sponsored protocols, including education, cultural, and financial programs.81 
The prospect of accession to membership remained absent, but in contrast to the ENP AP, 
these tangible aspects of Eastern Partnership cooperation offered clear incentives to 
Ukraine, and indicated a marked shift toward competition with Russia on behalf of the 
EU.  
The process of negotiating the agreements described in the preceding paragraphs 
also demonstrated a shift toward competition with Russia on behalf of the European 
Union. At the outset of negotiations over the DCFTA, the EU appeared to continue the 
historical trend of “take it or leave it” integration strategy. Andrey Ermolaev, Director of 
Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, observed that “European bureaucrats 
think that if Ukraine enters Europe, it should accept the European Rules. But . . . this is a 
large country, with a complex economical structure, and Europe must reckon with this.”82 
Perhaps as a result, negotiations on the DCFTA stalled. The election to the Presidency of 
Yanukovych in February 2010 was accompanied by a pursuit of pro-Russian policies, 
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such as the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet basing agreement, and a distancing from the 
West—including the enshrining in law of Ukraine’s non-aligned status.83  
The European Union’s response to these developments was evidence of an active 
attempt to compete against Ukraine’s shift to the East. President Yanukovych was invited 
to Brussels in September 2010 to smooth relations ahead of the scheduled EU-Ukrainian 
Summit in November of that year, evidence of European Union attempts to reverse the 
pro-Russian trend of Ukrainian Policy.84 The summit yielded conciliatory statements 
from Yanukovych, and the extension of tangible integration benefits (the previously 
described visa and protocol agreements) by Commission President Manuel Barroso.85 
Both parties recommitted to the negotiation of the DCFTA, which proceeded without any 
major incident until the November 2013 Vilnius Summit. Although Yanukovych 
ultimately declined to adopt the DCFTA in 2013, this summit illustrated the newfound 
willingness of the European Union to pursue closer cooperation with Ukraine. 
Previously, significant diplomacy by top leaders of the EU had been limited to support 
for the democracy movement of the Orange Revolution, while the cooperation projects 
were left to the bureaucratic level within the ENP and EaP frameworks. As the remainder 
of this chapter shows, Ukraine has continued to capture increasing attention at high levels 
of government within the European Union. 
Despite the higher level of attention afforded Ukraine, the European Union’s 
dialogue has continued to stress complementarity, not competition, with Russia. 
Although the West had longstanding, Ukraine-specific, institutional links with Kiev 
through NATO, EaP became the preferred forum for diplomatic engagement due to its 
focus on economic and civilian political issues, avoiding the potential tension that could 
have been sparked through deepening NATO ties or a NATO Membership Action Plan.86 
During the negotiation of the DCFTA, Russia attempted to lure Ukraine away from closer 
cooperation with the European Union and join the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs 
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Union (BRK-CU), an agreement that operates within the Russian Single Economic Space 
and that is legally incompatible with the DCFTA that was concluded between the EU and 
Ukraine in June 2014.87  
Despite this overt competition with Russia over trade with Ukraine, the European 
Union remained conciliatory. In response to Moscow’s proposal, in September 2013 
“European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle 
attempted to de-escalate the situation, declaring that this issue ‘is not a choice between 
Moscow and Brussels’ . . . Mr. Füle also promised that the European Commission is 
‘working on overcoming the issues of legal compatibility between the AA and CU’ in 
order to ‘prevent new walls in Europe.’”88  
This amicable effort by the European Union to advance cooperation with Ukraine 
while avoiding outright competition with Russia met with failure. Moscow threatened 
Ukraine with the loss of existing bilateral economic advantages while offering a $15 
billion loan. This resulted in the November 2013 rejection of the EU Association 
Agreement by President Yanukovych at the Vilnius Summit.89 The EU reacted 
vigorously, dispatching mediators to Kiev to negotiate arrangements for new elections 
that might result in the replacement of Yanukovych.90 Faced with growing political 
opposition from his own supporters and mass protests in the Euromaidan and elsewhere 
in Ukraine, Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014.91 The resulting crisis 
transformed European Union diplomacy into outright competition with Russia and 
introduced a new antagonistic dimension to the situation. 
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E. 2013 UKRAINE CRISIS AND CIVIL WAR 
The crisis that erupted over Ukraine marked a major shift in relations between the 
European Union and Russia. There is of course no single instant when the crisis began, 
but for the purposes of precision this study will consider President Yanukovych’s 
decision not to conclude the EU Association Agreement in November 2013 as the 
initiation of the current Ukrainian crisis. The course of events since November 2013 has 
radically altered the nature of the competition over Ukraine. The European Union has 
openly condemned Russian behavior toward Ukraine as illegal and unacceptable. The EU 
began directly punishing Russia with a series of economic sanctions beginning on 17 
March 2014.92  
Russia has employed military force, including soldiers and weapons, inside 
Ukrainian borders. The eruption of civil war between the Ukrainian government and pro-
Russian rebels in April 2014 has also drastically altered the nature of Ukrainian relations 
with foreign powers, including EU member states. These factors have galvanized the 
European Union into outright competition for Ukraine’s future, firmly aligning the EU 
against Russian intervention in the Ukrainian civil war. 
The evolution of the European Union’s diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis since 
November 2013 bears remarkable similarity to its development during the 2004 Orange 
Revolution—also a major turning point in EU-Ukrainian relations. Following 
Yanukovych’s rejection of the Association Agreement and DCFTA at Vilnius, European 
Union attitudes toward the Ukrainian government cooled as Yanukovych appeared to 
regress on respect for democratic standards, repressing pro-Western protestors and 
becoming increasingly authoritarian.93 The situation was reminiscent of early 2004, when 
the failure of the Common Strategy and concerns over Kuchma’s government chilled 
relations between the EU and Ukraine. Again a pro-Western popular movement, this one 
protesting the sudden abandonment of the AA/DCFTA, was targeted for political 
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repression. Again, just as the Orange Revolution prompted a European Union 
recommitment toward Ukraine, Yanukovych’s ouster and subsequent Russian behavior 
drew the European Union into deepening relations to new levels.  
The European Council swiftly unified to denounce Russian behavior, stating that 
“it strongly condemns the illegal annexation of Crimea” and declaring that “The 
European Union remains committed to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.”94 As with the internal divisions over how to respond to the Orange Revolution, 
however, the EU’s shift toward overt competition with Russia since November 2013 did 
not occur without debate.  
The discourse was again divided mainly along East-West lines. Poland and the 
Baltic states came out strongly in favor of overt competition with Russia. As early as 
March 2014, Estonian NATO Ambassador Lauri Lepik and Polish Foreign Minister 
Radoslaw Sikorski were calling for the permanent deployment of up to ten thousand 
NATO troops in their countries.95 France and Germany were initially more reluctant than 
Estonia and Poland to directly antagonize Russia, despite their dismay over the 
annexation of Crimea. France at first refused to consider termination of a planned sale of 
two amphibious assault warships to Russia. Germany as well sought to avoid damaging 
relations with Russia. Angela Merkel rejected calls for NATO to garrison Poland or the 
Baltics, arguing it would “flout the NATO-Russia accord for 1997”—a reference to the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act.96 Germany was initially reluctant to support broad 
sanctions against Russia. In May 2014 Merkel said of sanctions: “This is not necessarily 
                                                 
94European Council, “Conclusions on Ukraine,” European Union, March 20, 2014, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141707.pdf, 2. 
95Michael R. Gordon, “NATO to Firm Up Its Presence in Eastern Europe as it halts Cooperation With 
Russia,” The New York Times, April 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/europe/nato-
orders-end-to-practical-and-military-cooperation-with-
russia.html?emc=edit_th_20140402&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=58749493&_r=2. 
96Alison Smale, “German Leader Emerges as Key Figure in Ukraine Talks,” The New York Times, 
August 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/europe/german-leader-emerges-as-key-
figure-in-ukraine-talks.html. 
 28
what we want, but we are ready and prepared to go to such a step . . . My main aim would 
be, first and foremost, improve stabilization and see that the elections can happen.”97  
Continued escalation of the crisis, including the July 2014 destruction of civilian 
airliner MH17 and reports by NATO of confirmed Russian Army units fighting in eastern 
Ukraine, drove the member states of the European Union toward unified opposition to 
Russian activities. France took the major step of suspending its planned warship sale to 
Russia in September 2014.98 Germany has adopted a tough line against Russia, becoming 
a leading sponsor of broad EU sanctions. In September 2014 Merkel pushed for deep 
financial, capital, defense, and travel sanctions despite a tentative ceasefire agreed upon 
by Russia, Ukraine, and Ukrainian separatists on 5 September 2014.99 The European 
Council condemned “aggression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil,” and said 
that it “calls upon the Russian federation to immediately withdraw all its military assets 
and forces from Ukraine.”100 Furthermore, the Council expressed its support for the 
Ukrainian government, backing Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s peace plan and calling 
for trilateral negotiations between Brussels, Moscow, and Kiev over implementing the 
EU Association Agreement with Ukraine.101 It is evident from these trends that as a 
result of the crisis since November 2013, the European Union has reached a consensus on 
overtly opposing Russian intervention in Ukraine. 
The actions and proclamations of the European Union resulting from the new 
consensus reflect a deepened commitment to compete for influence in Ukraine. The 
European Union and Ukraine signed the Association Agreement and DCFTA in Brussels 
on June 27th 2014. Aside from the extension of EU influence represented by this 
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agreement described in the preceding section, signing the AA/DCFTA was a direct 
rejection of Russia. President Putin declared that the agreement “attempts to impose an 
artificial choice between Europe and Russia.”102 The European Union’s willingness to 
pursue closer cooperation with Ukraine even in the face of Russian military intervention 
that had already seized Ukrainian territory is demonstrative of the high level of value that 
the EU has come to put on Ukraine.  
The diplomatic language of key leaders in EU countries has also come to reflect 
the theme that the old strategy of conciliation with Russia has come to an end, and that a 
competitive environment is the new norm. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, co-
sponsor of the EaP along with Poland’s Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, wrote that “the 
invasion, occupation, and annexation of Crimea was a clear violation of fundamental 
principles of European security and international law.”103 Statements issued by NATO, 
which has 22 members that are also European Union member states, are illustrative of the 
perception of a major shift in the European order. NATO Deputy Secretary General 
Alexander Vershbow declared in September 2014 that “there has been a fundamental 
change to our relationship with Russia.”104 Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
stated in June 2014 that “there will be no business as usual with Russia until Russia 
comes back into line with its international obligations,” referring to the annexation of 
Crimea.105  
The institutional leadership of the European Union is also adapting to the new 
competitive approach. Donald Tusk, a Pole who developed a reputation as a hardliner on 
Russian relations during his service as Poland’s Prime Minister, was selected to assume 
the presidency of the European Council in August 2014. With Tusk at the helm of the 
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EU, the vocal concern over Russia expressed in Poland and the Baltic states has gained a 
prominent and influential outlet. Alongside Tusk, Italian Federica Mogherini was chosen 
to succeed Lady Catherine Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs. Mogherini has been criticized as being too sympathetic toward Russia, but 
following her appointment she described the Ukraine crisis as “a time of complete 
darkness,” and told the EU Parliament that “we need to respond in the strongest possible 
way,” indicating that, officially at least, she will align with the EU consensus to oppose 
the Russian intervention in Ukraine.106  
The European Union’s direct competition with Russia during the crisis has 
occurred mainly within the economic arena. Between March and September 2014, the EU 
enacted four rounds of sanctions against the Russian Federation and individual Russian 
citizens. As a coordinated collective including several of the largest economies of the 
world, the EU enjoys unique advantages in exerting economic pressure. As Russia’s 
biggest trading partner, it is able to deny Russia access to its most important market.107 
The European Union has also proven agile in adjusting to the cost of sanctions, including 
retaliation by Russia, to its own economy—supplying the EU with greater staying power 
in an economic struggle. The European Commission has coordinated economic relief 
measures to redirect affected goods within the EU, begun exploring alternate markets in 
third party nations, and in August 2014 made €155 million available as short term 
compensation to affected EU firms. 108  
Russia has not employed energy restrictions against the EU during the Ukraine 
crisis—owing in part to Russia’s determination to demonstrate that it is a reliable 
supplier—but there is evidence that the EU may be resilient in this realm as well. A 2014 
study by the University of Cologne’s Institute of Energy Economics indicated that the EU 
could survive up to 6 months without Russian gas supplies before suffering significant 
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shortages.109 Meanwhile, in September 2014 Gazprom gas production was 7.4 percent 
below forecast due to the impact of the crisis despite the lack of energy-specific 
sanctions, indicating that a broad energy blockade could become unsustainable for 
Russia.110 Russia did restrict gas exports to Ukraine in June 2014. The European Union, 
however, has also proven agile in mitigating this strategy. Slovakia has prepared a gas 
pipeline for “reverse flow” to Ukraine, able to supply gas from the EU; and Austria, 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland could also participate in this effort.111 
At the time of this writing, the Ukraine crisis has yet to be resolved. Yet it appears 
clear already that the European Union’s involvement in Ukraine, bolstered by a 
commitment to compete with Russia, has entered a new phase. The European Union has 
demonstrated awareness that it is in a competition, and it has taken concrete steps to 
deepen its cooperation with Ukraine, and to directly impose negative consequences on 
Russia for its armed intervention and policy of coercion in Ukraine. If peace is 
reestablished and the provisions of the Association Agreement and DCFTA are 
implemented, there is likely to be a continuation of the trend of increasing European 
Union interest and influence in Ukraine.  
F. CONCLUSION 
When Ukraine attained independence in 1991, the European Union regarded it as 
just another state on its eastern periphery. Official engagement programs, including the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the European Neighborhood Program, 
reflected conditional diplomacy, placing the burden of the interaction on Ukraine while 
offering little in the way of tangible incentives. Indeed, the European Union did not 
regard its interactions with Ukraine during this period as steps in a competition for 
influence with Russia; and the EU was careful to avoid conveying the impression that the 
PCA or ENP would create new divisions within Europe.  
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The 2004 enlargement of the European Union, and the pro-Western, democratic, 
Orange Revolution began to change the EU’s policy of keeping Ukraine at arm’s length. 
The liberal norms and democratic values of the EU drove it to express vocal support for 
the Orange Revolution. Internally, the EU’s newly acceded Eastern European members, 
including Poland and the Baltic States, demanded that the EU’s relations with Ukraine 
become more prominent due to their interests in the region. As a result, the European 
Union for the first time made a palpable effort to deepen its influence in Ukraine. The 
European Neighborhood Policy codified an Action Plan for EU-Ukrainian cooperation, 
and established concrete, if minor, economic and political gains to reward Ukraine for its 
association.  
As the ENP reached the limits of its effectiveness, the EU’s Eastern members 
again pushed for deeper ties, sponsoring the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership 
significantly sharpened the competition over Ukraine. The Association Agreement and 
DCFTA promise to create strong legal and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine, 
potentially causing a permanent economic and political shift away from Russia. Despite 
efforts by the European Commission to downplay these programs as a potential source of 
conflict between East and West, Russia has responded with aggressive efforts to retain its 
influence.  
The sudden abandonment of Ukraine’s aspirations for an Association Agreement 
by President Yanukovych in late 2013 developed into a crisis, bringing the competition 
between the EU and Russia into the open. As a result, there has been a major shift in EU 
policy. The EU has made public statements critical of Russian behavior in Ukraine. The 
EU has directly punished Russia with economic sanctions, and its leaders have 
acknowledged the emergence of a vastly different security environment, demanding a 
return to deterrence. The EU and Ukraine have tightened their relationship, signing the 
AA/DCFTA.  
Despite the new European Union policy, the current crisis may demonstrate the 
limits of EU influence in Ukraine. Due to the continuing high level of economic 
interdependence between Ukraine and Russia, the EU was forced to postpone 
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implementation of the DCFTA due to fears of Russian economic retaliation.112 Accession 
to membership in the European Union, a top Ukrainian strategic goal, seems to be further 
out of reach than ever before following the Russian military intervention. While Ukraine 
may not accede to the EU for decades, it is clear that both Ukraine and the European 
Union have committed to deeper cooperation, and demonstrate a high level of alignment 
in foreign policy. As of this writing the crisis is still ongoing, but the trend toward 
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III. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a Ukrainian state had existed 
only briefly (1918–1921) during Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution. For much of history, the 
concept of an independent Ukraine would have been alien to most Russians. Indeed, 
Ukraine and its territory are in many ways an inseparable part of Russia’s historical 
identity. Russia’s relationship with the territory of Ukraine dates back to 880 AD and the 
founding of Kievan Rus. Russian civilization itself stems from this proto-state, which was 
the cultural and political ancestor to the Russian Empire.113 The cities of Kiev, Odessa, 
Sevastopol, and Kerch figure highly in Russian national memory, and were accorded the 
status of “Hero Cities” to honor the hundreds of thousands of Russian and other Soviet 
soldiers who died in them during the Second World War.114 In his March 2014 address 
on the annexation of Crimea to Russia, President Vladimir Putin reminded his audience 
that  
everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the 
location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His 
spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the 
culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery 
brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea.115 
History and identity drive Russian emotional investment in Ukraine. These factors 
also align closely with Russian aspirations to compete for dominance in peripheral states. 
This chapter will demonstrate that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian 
policy has consistently aimed at bringing Ukraine squarely within Moscow’s sphere of 
influence and opposing Ukrainian integration with the European Union. From Ukrainian 
independence in 1991 to the present, Russia has regarded competition for influence in the 
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country as a zero sum game in which any improvement of relations between Kiev and 
Brussels is regarded as a loss for Moscow.116 Russia seeks to secure its interests in 
Ukraine via traditional and non-traditional tools of state power, rather than the strategy of 
norm sharing, conditionality, and economic integration favored by the European Union. 
This chapter will show that Russia seeks to establish exclusive influence over Ukraine via 
Russian-dominated institutions, application of pressure in the economic and energy 
sectors, and military power. The chapter will also examine how Russia sponsors and 
exploits ethnic tensions and a “Pan-Slavic” identity to gain a political advantage over 
Ukraine and stymie the European Union, an approach also applied in other “frozen 
conflicts,” including Georgia and Moldova.117 As articulated in Chapter II, the European 
Union has not always understood that it was involved in a competition with Russia, or 
that it needed to compete with Russia over Ukraine, and it has at times deliberately 
avoided doing so. While the actual intensity of Russian competition with the EU has 
varied depending on the strength of Moscow’s economic and military condition, the 
Russian Federation’s strategy has been consistently aimed at establishing Russian 
dominance.  
B. RUSSIA’S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE STRATEGY 
In contrast to the European Union’s strategy of institution-building, 
multilateralism, normative engagement, and “take it or leave it” conditionality, Russia 
prefers to follow traditional power politics and establish a solely Russian sphere of 
influence while taking measures to exclude the European Union.118 The countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and especially former Soviet states, are perceived by 
Moscow as rightfully within the Russian sphere.119 Moscow has expressed resentment at 
efforts by the European Union to deepen engagement and integration with these states, 
interpreting such actions as deliberate attempts to undermine Russian influence, to the 
extent that some Russian officials are convinced that the “color revolutions” in Georgia 
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and Ukraine were in fact orchestrated by the United States and western European 
governments.120 Even in the absence of the perception of deliberate efforts by the 
European Union to encroach upon Russian interests, Moscow feels threatened by the EU 
because the multilateral principles and liberal norms it embodies are perceived as 
antithetical to Russian interests, and irreconcilable with Russia’s desire to establish itself 
as the central state of a power bloc in eastern Europe.121  
Russian efforts to establish and maintain a sphere of influence have persisted 
despite attempts by Western powers over the last two and a half decades to alter the 
adversarial dynamic of the Cold War. Both NATO and the European Union have 
attempted to bring Russia into a new international order based upon liberal norms. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO articulated a new role for the alliance 
that envisioned supporting democracy promotion, transparency, and collective 
security.122 NATO’s continued existence and enlargement were described as stabilizing 
factors that would benefit all European states, including Russia. Shortly after the Cold 
War ended, Russian President Yeltsin seemed to welcome a new European order, and 
raised the possibility of Russia seeking NATO membership in 1991 and 1993.123 His 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev even stated that Russia considered NATO “one of the 
mechanisms of stability in Europe and in the world as a whole,” further adding that “our 
desire is to cooperate with this mechanism.”124  
Russian behavior since 1991, however, has revealed that Russian expectations for 
a new European order were fundamentally different from those of the West. The Russian 
view is that NATO, if it continues to exist at all, should be a mere political forum, or be 
subordinated to the OSCE, or since 2008, to the terms of the proposed European Security 
Treaty sponsored by Moscow. As early as 1993 President Yeltsin declared that “Russia 
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was and continues to be a great world power,” and that Moscow would not “shy away 
from defending our own interests.”125 NATO’s December 1996 proposal to establish 
confidence building measures and improved transparency via permanent military liaisons 
at various Allied and Russian military commands was rejected outright by Moscow.126 
The NATO-Russian Founding Act, perhaps the major institutional achievement of 
rapprochement between the Cold War adversaries, was described by Russian Foreign 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov as merely “damage limitation,” indicating that Russia never 
approached the agreement in a spirit of cooperation but was rather simply limiting 
damage to its interests.127  
The European Union’s diplomatic outreach programs have been similarly 
spurned. Beyond formalizing engagement with states along the EU’s eastern frontier, the 
ENP also had a second dimension designed to assist Russia in transformation to a 
successful democratic state.128 Russia, however, has been sharply critical of the ENP, 
preferring to conduct relations with the EU on a bilateral basis. Russia also opposed 
Ukraine’s inclusion in the ENP program on the basis that the former Soviet republic was 
not a legitimate target of EU influence.129 Russia also rejected the successor EAP 
program as an attempt to expand Brussels’s power at Moscow’s expense. Following the 
EaP announcement, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov caustically asked, “what is the 
Eastern Partnership if not an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence?”130 That 
Russia assigns the highest level of importance to defeating the spread of Western norms, 
institutions, and influence has been evident in Moscow’s actions in Ukraine since 
Russian troops without insignia appeared in Crimea in February 2014. When the 
February 2014 ouster of Viktor Yanukovych presented Russia with a defeat of its 
diplomatic efforts to derail deepening Ukrainian cooperation with the EU, Moscow 
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swiftly turned to military force to exert its influence and turn Ukraine away from 
Brussels.131  
Due to these developments, a sometimes veiled competition between the 
European Union and Russia has come into sharp focus. The influential German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel said of Russian behavior: ““Nothing justifies or excuses the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia . . . Nothing justifies the direct or indirect participation 
of Russia in the fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk . . . Russia is calling into question 
Europe’s peaceful order and it is trampling on international law.”132 Shortly after 
assuming office in December 2014, President of the European Council Donald Tusk 
stated that “Russia is a strategic problem,” a noticeable change from the EU’s preferred 
and long-standing description of Russia as a strategic partner.133 Competition between 
the EU and Russia is now obvious, and Ukraine has become a central focus of that 
conflict. 
It is possible that Moscow possesses this attitude simply because of the long 
history of animosity and strategic competition between western European states and 
Russia. However, the Russian Federation has been consistent in its strategy of seeking to 
establish preponderant influence over its non-European neighbors. Russia has 
consistently sought to use the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to accomplish 
hegemonic aspirations along its central Asian border with Kazakhstan.134 Since Vladimir 
Putin’s assumption of the Presidency Russia has also made an effort, albeit with little 
success, to establish Russian influence in East Asian states and thereby constrain the 
power of the United States.135  
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C. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN UKRAINE 
Apart from Russia itself, Ukraine is the most populous and economically dynamic 
successor state of the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s economic circumstances, geographic 
positions, strategic importance to Russian security, and demographics help explain why 
Moscow has taken an enduring and consistent interest in securing influence in the 
country. Until 1991, Ukraine was part of a single economic market along with Russia 
within the Soviet Union. Russia and Ukraine have shared a major interest in mitigating 
the negative effects of the separation imposed by the dissolution of the USSR. A major 
purpose of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was to help overcome 
economic dislocations resulting from the new national borders.136 The CIS, in turn, has 
motivated and enabled Russian elites to interfere in Ukrainian policy because economic 
developments in the CIS have major implications for Russia domestically.137 Since the 
end of the Cold War, Ukraine has remained economically vital to Russia. In 2013, 
Ukraine was Russia’s third largest source of imports, according to the World Trade 
Organization.138 Russian-Ukrainian trade, moreover, is largely in industrial products and 
other advanced sectors of the economy, as opposed to Russia’s imports from the 
European Union, which have a strong agrarian character.139 The content of this trade 
means that it is a major strategic interest despite being much smaller in volume compared 
to the Russian trade with the European Union. Moscow has an abiding interest in 
obstructing deeper cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union because legal 
conflicts between free trade arrangements with the European Union and the Russian-
sponsored customs union would threaten Russia’s trade prospects and compromise 
Moscow’s ability to influence Ukrainian economic policy through the structures of the 
CIS or the nascent Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).140 
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Russia has a vital interest in Ukraine as both an enabler and recipient of its power 
projection strategies. Ukraine plays a major role in Russia’s ability to exert influence in 
Europe through control of energy supplies. 25 percent of the European Union’s gas 
supplies come from Russia, and 80% of that supply is transferred through Ukrainian 
territory.141 Russia has used control of energy supplies to influence decision making in 
the capitals of the European Union, the Balkans, and Ukraine itself.142 Deeper 
cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union would bring Ukrainian energy 
infrastructure under a common EU energy policy, restricting Russia’s ability to exert 
pressures on governments in the EU and the Balkans.143 
Ukraine is also an important state in Moscow’s strategy of seeking to use local 
populations of ethnic Russians to project political power. Russia has claimed a right and 
responsibility to ensure security for the 25 million ethnic Russians left outside Russian 
borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union.144  
Ukraine is a major consideration in Russian security strategies as well. The 
Crimean peninsula and city of Sevastopol represent a vital line of communication 
between Russia, Europe in the west, and Russia’s Asian frontier in the east.145 A major 
instrument of Russian military strength, the Black Sea Fleet, is based in Sevastopol. 
Russian access was assured through a lease with Ukraine, but there is evidence that 
Moscow was not convinced that this arrangement was a secure, long term option. The 
terms renewing Russia’s right to continue to base the fleet in Sevastopol were arrived at 
in part through pressure exerted by Moscow exploiting Ukrainian energy dependence on 
Russia.146 Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was undoubtedly motivated in 
part by the strategic importance of the fleet: President Vladimir Putin’s address to the 
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Duma justifying the annexation specifically mentioned the Black Sea Fleet and maritime 
security no less than three times.147 Ukraine has a significant population of Russians and 
Russian speakers, especially in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Ethnic Russians within 
Ukraine are strongly supportive of building institutional ties with Russia.148 Moscow is 
keen to take advantage of these sentiments in Ukraine and in other nations to solidify its 
influence and obstruct the European Union. 
Ukraine’s significance to Russian security also resides in its continued importance 
to the Russian military-industrial sector. As of 2014, Ukrainian factories supplied Russia 
with a variety of vital military products, including targeting computers for tanks, 
helicopter engines, naval supplies, and parts for SS-18 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.149 While the 2014 conflict has spurred Russian officials to reduce dependency 
on Ukrainian products, wholesale replacement is a multi-billion dollar effort that will 
require years of rebuilding infrastructure.150  
Ukraine’s geographic position ensures that it will always be a major security 
interest for Russia regardless of the future status of the Black Sea Fleet or military-
industrial considerations. Maintaining Ukraine as a “buffer area” squarely within the 
Russian camp has long been considered vital to the protecting the integrity of the core 
Russian state. The Russian state was built by military conquest of culturally and 
historically disparate regions.151 Both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union relied on 
a militarized society to maintain a multicultural and multiethnic polity.152 Consequently, 
in periods of relative military weakness, such as that which has prevailed in Russia since 
the end of the Cold War (despite a sustained military modernization effort since 2008), 
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the Russian government experiences such a massive sense of vulnerability that it 
considers its sovereignty itself at risk.153 In other words, the “loss” of Ukraine to the 
European Union is considered unacceptable by Moscow; it would set a precedent 
enabling further paring away of territory considered to be Russian and a possible loss of 
Russian sovereignty. 
D. RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS 
Ukraine has a low level of multilateral institutional relations with Russia. Unlike 
fellow post-Soviet states Belarus and Kazakhstan, Ukraine is not a member of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the BRK-CU (Belarus, Russia, 
Kazakhstan Customs Union), or the Single Economic Space, and Ukraine is not expected 
to become a member of the pending Eurasian Economic Union. The Commonwealth of 
Independent States is the main institutional tie between Russia and Ukraine outside of 
purely bilateral arrangements. Ukraine’s attitude toward the CIS is rather lukewarm. Kiev 
is not an enthusiastic member, participating in CIS programs selectively, and has even 
taken the initiative of founding a regional organization of its own—the GUAM (Georgia 
Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova) framework—of which Russia is not a member.154  
Despite the scarcity of institutional ties and Ukrainian resistance to taking policy 
cues from the CIS, Russia has remained steadily committed to using international 
institutions controlled by Moscow to compete for influence in Ukraine. Russia, especially 
since the ascension of Vladimir Putin to power, has sought to establish the CIS (and 
forthcoming EEU) as a parallel integration force in competition with the European 
Union.155 Moscow’s Medium Term strategy, published in 1999, asserts that Russia is the 
natural leader of the CIS, and states that Moscow is “against the establishment of ‘special 
relations’ by the EU with individual CIS countries to the detriment of Russian interests,” 
implying that Russia regards CIS member states as within its legitimate sphere of 
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influence.156 Russian use of international institutions as an extension of national will has 
even drawn criticism from allies Belarus and Kazakhstan; they complained in October 
2013 that the Russian government had too much control over the BRK-CU.157 Russia has 
sought to use institutions to obtain influence in Ukraine on several occasions. While 
Ukraine has avoided across the board participation in CIS programs and agencies, a high 
level of interdependence between Ukraine and Russia has allowed Russia to exercise 
power through the CIS when it chooses to.158 Russia successfully pressured Ukraine into 
signing 30 out of 53 CIS agreements on collective security.159 While Ukraine has a high 
level of alignment with European Union CFSP declarations, its security agreements 
through the CIS have precluded adoption of the EU’s positions on Belarus or the 
Caucasus—high interest issues to Moscow.160 For its part Ukraine must seek to align 
with Russian-sponsored institutions to help compensate for the loss of the Soviet Union’s 
single market.161 The Kuchma administration was enticed to move toward joining the 
Single Economic Space in 2003, before those plans were disrupted by the Orange 
Revolution.162 The prospect of Ukrainian membership in the Single Economic Space was 
again raised by Russia to entice President Viktor Yanukovych toward pro-Russian 
policies in 2010.163  
Despite Yanukovych’s relative friendliness to Russian interests, his 
administration continued to resist a high level of Ukrainian participation in a Customs 
Union or the CSTO.164 The politics of competition between Russian-dominated 
international institutions and the European Union, however, motivated aggressive 
Russian intervention in the country. Low levels of Ukrainian participation in the CIS 
                                                 
156Adomeit, “Russia and its Near Neighbourhood,” 12. 
157Havlik, “Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit,” 25. 
158Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 858. 
159Ibid., 853. 
160Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance,” 853. 
161Ibid., 860. 
162Linkevičius,”European Neighborhood Policy,” 79. 
163Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations,” 273. 
164Ibid., 264–265. 
 45
proved that it was a poor means for maintaining a sphere of influence, and Russia lost 
interest in the CIS as a tool by 2009.165 Moscow, however, was unwilling to concede 
Ukraine to the EU. The stronger market and energy ties between the EU and Ukraine 
represented by the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) would limit Russia’s ability to influence Ukrainian economic 
policy and preclude any possibility of Ukrainian participation in the Eurasian Economic 
Union.166 Russia used the combination of economic threats and the loan of fifteen billion 
USD to Ukraine in 2013 to reject the AA/DCFTA and keep open the possibility of 
Ukraine eventually joining the EEU.167 Even after Yanukovych’s February 2014 ouster 
allowed Ukraine and the EU to approve the deal, Ukraine was forced to suspend 
implementation of the pact because Russia threatened to impose trade restrictions.168 
The Eurasian Economic Union came into existence on January 1, 2015. No capital 
can be sure exactly what final form it will take, or to what extent Moscow will succeed in 
its ambition to establish it as a competitor to the EU. The Ukraine Crisis since November 
2013 has made clear that Ukraine will not be a member of the EEU in the foreseeable 
future. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s experience with the CIS, Single Economic Space, and 
BRK-CU demonstrate Russia’s commitment to use international institutions as a means 
to build influence in Kiev while simultaneously limiting penetration by the European 
Union.  
E. RUSSIAN ENERGY POLITICS IN UKRAINE 
Russia’s vast energy resources are both a source of economic strength and a tool 
for coercive diplomacy. Russia has demonstrated a consistent strategy to employ its huge 
share hold in European energy supplies to encourage many governments to support 
Moscow’s interests and obstruct the expansion of the European Union’s influence. 
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Russian energy policies in Ukraine form part of a broader energy strategy that seeks to 
extend Moscow’s power throughout the Balkans and the Caucasus region. Russian 
investment in energy transport infrastructure in the Balkans, and control of the energy 
source, have permitted Russia to manipulate energy prices for political gain—threatening 
price hikes to deter governments from antagonizing Moscow, or reducing energy rates to 
price out any attempt by the European Union to introduce its own energy initiatives.169 
Azerbaijan’s 2013 initiative to construct a pipeline to funnel Caspian gas to Europe 
enables Russia to play the Balkans, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan against each other in energy 
transport negotiations, further strengthening Moscow’s coercive power.170 
Consistent with Russia’s regional energy diplomacy, the history of Russian 
energy relations with Ukraine is indicative of a sustained campaign to entice Kiev to 
support Moscow’s interests, or deter it from adopting pro-Western policies. Ukraine is 
heavily dependent upon Russia for energy; 35 percent of gas and 75% of oil used by 
Ukraine originates in Russia.171 Shortly after Ukrainian independence, Russia attempted 
to trade cancellation of Ukrainian gas debts in exchange for a long term agreement on 
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and surrender of the nuclear weapons that Ukraine had inherited 
from the Soviet Union.172 At the time, Ukrainian elites were more interested in security 
guarantees from Russia, where the Duma had revealed an unwillingness to accept the 
independence of Ukraine as a whole and Crimea in particular in 1993.173 The nuclear 
weapons issue was settled by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine agreed 
to transfer all Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia and accede to the Nonproliferation 
Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state in return for official security assurances from 
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London, Moscow, and Washington.174 In this case energy politics were not the deciding 
factor in the negotiations, but Russian intent to use energy as a lever was clear.175  
Following the Orange Revolution in 2004, a gas crisis erupted between Russia 
and Ukraine in early 2006. While the public reason given for the dispute was an inability 
to agree on prices, an ulterior motive on the part of Moscow was probably to pressure the 
pro-Western Yuschenko regime.176 In the 2007 elections, a faction led by Russia friendly 
Viktor Yanukovych took control of the Ukrainian government after Russia reminded the 
Ukrainian electorate “that although they are free to choose the government of their will, it 
should not be forgotten that Russia has the leverage to influence Ukrainian politics and 
will be more tolerant towards a pro-Russian, rather than pro-Western government.”177 A 
2007 study indicated that Ukraine participated in CIS-sponsored security agreements 
“only under extreme energy supplies-related pressure by Russia.”178 In 2010, Moscow 
employed a gas deal as a carrot to renew the lease to the Black Sea Fleet’s naval base in 
Sevastopol, successfully using the same strategy that had failed in 1993.179 In the 
Ukraine crisis since November 2013, Russia has repeatedly threatened to cut off gas 
supplies to Ukraine during the winter season in an effort to gain negotiating leverage with 
Kiev.180 While some energy issues, such as the 1999 dispute, appear to be chiefly 
contractual in nature, it is undeniable that Russia has taken advantage of Ukraine’s 
dependence on Russian energy to exert Moscow’s will. 
Russian energy policies in Ukraine are of major interest to the European Union 
due to Ukraine’s importance as an energy transit corridor to the European Union, and 
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Russia’s use of energy to oppose the EU’s influence in Ukraine itself. As of 2008, 80% of 
the energy supplies the EU purchased from Russia transited through Ukraine.181 25% of 
the EU’s total energy supplies are sourced from Russia.182 The European Union’s need to 
ensure stable delivery of energy, and Russian desires to exclude EU influence from 
Ukraine, have created fierce competition. Significant cooperation between the EU and 
Ukraine in the energy domain began with a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding to 
explore standardization options in Ukrainian energy infrastructure to improve 
compatibility with the EU.183 In 2009, the European Union and Ukraine attempted to 
initiate a joint project aimed at modernizing Ukrainian energy infrastructure without any 
Russian participation or influence.184  
Energy-related cooperation with the EU represents a major threat to Russian 
ambitions in Ukraine because it would limit Russia’s ability to exclusively influence 
Ukrainian economic policies.185 Russian President Vladimir Putin quickly acted to 
prevent any EU penetration of Russia’s energy monopoly in Ukraine. In Putin’s words, 
“if Russia’s interests are being ignored, then we will be forced to revise our relationship 
with our partners. We really do not want things to reach that level. But the main point, 
which I would like to emphasize, is that trying to solve the problem of increasing gas 
supplies, gas which is Russian, is meaningless. We want this signal to be heard.”186 As 
result, the EU initiative was scrapped.  
Energy policies have played an important role in shaping the EU-Russian 
competition since November 2013. Dependence on Russian energy resources by some 
EU members has served Russian interests by promoting debate within the European 
Union founded on the fears of some members that Russia could restrict their energy 
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supplies in retaliation for any strong EU censure of Russia. Germany, one of the most 
influential EU states, is particularly dependent on Russian energy supplies and initially 
was wary of mounting strong sanctions on Russia in the early phases of the Ukraine crisis 
due to concerns over its energy supply.187 Then-Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk 
provoked strong opposition from German Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy 
Sigmar Gabriel when he proposed an EU energy syndicate to jointly negotiate energy 
purchases with Russia.188 Germany prefers to avoid antagonizing Russia on energy 
policy and therefore supports keeping energy purchases within the private sector.  
Russia’s gas embargo on Ukraine, beginning in June 2014, has nevertheless 
drawn the European Union into direct confrontation with Russia over energy issues. 
Several European Union states have attempted to support Kiev’s resistance to Russian 
pressure by supplying Ukraine with gas through a technique called “reverse flow.” This 
tactic involves European Union member states purchasing gas from Russia, then 
delivering it to Ukraine through pipelines normally used to transport energy from Russia 
to Europe. In September 2014 Russia forced its EU clients to cease supporting Ukraine 
through reverse flow operations by threatening to cut off gas supplies to Europe 
entirely.189 Russia’s use of energy to pressure both Ukraine and its potential European 
Union supporters in the crisis since November 2013 is a clear continuation of a long term 
Russian strategy to employ energy coercion to keep Ukraine within Moscow’s sphere of 
influence and exclude penetration by the European Union. 
F. RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER AND UKRAINE 
Post-Soviet Russia has a track record of using military power to achieve its 
objectives in neighboring states. A theme of coercion using military means can be parsed 
out, especially once the Russian military began to recover from the post-Soviet decline in 
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the late 2000s. Moscow’s favored tactics are nuclear threats, intimidation with 
conventional forces, and actual use of military force—which has taken the form of both 
standard and hybrid warfare. 
Russia’s nuclear arsenal is the one aspect of Russian military power that has 
remained threatening throughout the two and a half decades since the end of the Cold 
War in 1989–1991. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to employ veiled and explicit 
nuclear threats to achieve its ends in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. In 2008, ahead of 
NATO’s Bucharest Summit, Putin made clear that Russia considered Ukrainian 
membership in NATO unacceptable and outright threatened to target Ukraine with 
nuclear weapons if it joined the alliance.190 Moscow has consistently employed similar 
tactics around the region. In 2013, Leonid Reshetnikov—the head of a major strategic 
think tank reportedly responsible directly to Putin—implied that Russia would have to 
target both Serbia and Montenegro with nuclear weapons if those nations pursued 
membership in the European Union.191 In both 2009 and 2013 the Russian military 
openly conducted a large scale nuclear exercise simulating a nuclear attack on 
Warsaw.192 The potential for Russia to actually use nuclear weapons in offensive combat 
is difficult to assess, but Moscow is clearly willing to use its nuclear arsenal for strategic 
posturing and signaling aimed to promote Russian interests. 
Nuclear threats are not Russia’s only means of military influence. Russia has also 
established a trend in the use of conventional military power to intimidate or directly 
intervene in other countries to secure advantages for Moscow. Russia appeared in danger 
of suffering a major setback in the competition over Ukraine in 2008 when the chief 
leaders of the Orange Revolution factions, Viktor Yuschenko (then Ukraine’s President) 
and Yulia Tymoshenko (then Prime Minister), sent a joint letter to NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer requesting a NATO Membership Action Plan for Ukraine 
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at the upcoming April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit.193 In response, Putin publicly 
announced at the NATO-Russia Council that such a move would be regarded as a “direct 
threat” to Russia, and reportedly privately told U.S. President George W. Bush that 
“Ukraine is not a real state,” and threatened war to seize Crimea and eastern Ukraine if 
NATO moved ahead with a membership plan.194 Under President Viktor Yanukovych 
Ukraine’s government lost interest in NATO membership and enshrined nonalignment by 
law in 2010, so Putin’s strategy was evidently successful.195  
The credibility of Russian military threats—and consistency in strategy—were 
demonstrated without question later in 2008 during the Georgia-Russia war. The 
Saakashvili government in Tbilisi was far more vocal in defiance of Moscow than 
Ukraine had been up to that point, prompting Russia to firmly assert its dominance with a 
military campaign. Within a year of the Georgia-Russia conflict, relations with NATO 
and the EU returned to “business as usual,” indicating to Russia that military action was a 
viable strategy for preventing states from building closer ties with Western 
organizations.196  
Russian experiences with the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, the Georgian Rose 
Revolution, and the 2014 ouster of Yanukovych have prompted an effort to envision a 
military doctrine to counter “color revolutions.”197 In 2014 Putin ordered that Russia’s 
2010 Military Doctrine be revised to include strategies to counter political movements in 
neighboring states deemed threatening to Russian interests, and established a Defense 
Management Center specifically devoted to managing future political situations.198 These 
developments indicate that Russia envisions a major role for the military in any future 
competition over states on its periphery. 
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What facts are known concerning Russia’s interventions in Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine since early 2014 provide further evidence of Moscow’s willingness to use force 
to secure its interests and hamper Ukrainian cooperation with the European Union. The 
February 2014 ouster of President Yanukovych by pro-Western factions presented 
Moscow with the failure of its efforts to prevent closer cooperation between the EU and 
Ukraine and the prospect that Ukraine would move irreversibly out of reach of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. Moscow’s options to pursue its interests through Ukraine’s 
political system were exhausted. Just as when faced with a defiant Georgian government 
that refused to bow to pressure, Moscow swiftly opted to exercise the military option.  
Four days after Yanukovych fled Kiev Russia conducted a surprise military 
exercise near the Ukrainian border involving over 150,000 personnel, 90 aircraft and 880 
tanks.199 This exercise drew worldwide attention and concern but was evidently not 
designed only to intimidate, but rather was a “Maskirovka,” or deception, disguising the 
activities of unmarked forces—Russian troops operating without insignia—in Crimea. In 
seizing and then annexing Crimea, Russia secured the Black Sea Fleet headquarters and 
reclaimed a territory than many Russian politicians felt naturally belonged to Russia in 
the first place. Pursuing these interests, however, created difficulties in achieving the 
strategic objective of a pliant Ukraine within a Russian sphere of influence. The seizure 
of Crimea eliminated any residual willingness of the new Ukrainian government to 
attempt to balance its position between Russia and the European Union. The new 
government under President Petro Poroshenko signed the Association Agreement with 
the EU in June 2014.200 Poroshenko also reversed Ukraine’s policy of military non-
alignment, indicating a renewed desire for NATO membership by announcing plans to 
hold a referendum on joining the alliance.201  
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Despite being faced with a committed adversary in Poroshenko’s government, 
Russia has continued to use military power with the aim of destabilizing the Ukrainian 
political system. According to evidence published by NATO, Russia is supporting 
separatist forces in eastern Ukraine by supply convoys and the provision of heavy 
weapons, including tanks, artillery, and air defense units.202 Igor Strelkov, one-time 
leader of the Luhansk People’s Republic and self-claimed instigator of the civil war 
underway since 2014, is a Russian citizen and appears to have some connection to 
Moscow.203 As Ukrainian government forces made progress in reclaiming territory from 
separatists, Russia escalated its military support, again directly intervening. In late 
August 2014, the Russian army crossed the border and routed a Ukrainian offensive.204 
The advantage Russia seeks with its continued military intervention in Ukraine is 
twofold. Putin has demanded a federalization of Ukraine with autonomous powers 
devolved to eastern Ukraine, a situation which would allow Russia to position itself as 
the protector of the Donbas region and influence decisions in Kiev through proxies in the 
nominal Donbas regional government.205 The existence of an autonomous, pro-Russian 
region within Ukraine would also likely make any closer ties with the EU or NATO 
impossible as the Donbas region of Ukraine would presumably oppose the spread of 
Western influence. 
Russia has also taken military action to shape the broader competition with the 
European Union in conjunction with the Ukraine crisis. Putin reportedly boasted to 
Ukraine’s President, Petro Poroshenko, that, “If I wanted, in two days I could have 
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Russian troops not only in Kiev, but also in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, and 
Bucharest,” an obvious threat to the European Union but also a message to other states 
considering membership that the EU could not even protect itself, let alone their 
countries.206 As tension in Europe has escalated during the Ukraine crisis, Russia has 
stepped up military activity along its border with the EU member states in the Baltic and 
dramatically increased patrols by military aircraft in the Baltic Sea. Russian military 
intimidation has contributed to a rift in the EU (and NATO), with eastern members such 
as Latvia demanding a strong permanent military presence to defend their countries, 
juxtaposed with a reluctance to undertake such major steps by countries further afield 
such as Germany. Russia seems committed to its strategy of intimidation. In his annual 
address to the Duma in December 2014, Putin reportedly argued that “European nations 
‘have forgotten national pride and sovereignty,’ while declaring that Russia is different, 
strong, its armed forces formidable, its freedom and sovereignty sacrosanct.”207  
G. EXPLOITATION OF CULTURE AND ETHNICITY IN UKRAINE 
The cultural and ethnic angle of Russian relations with Ukraine follows a trend in 
broader Russian diplomatic strategy. In 1995 President Yeltsin asserted that the territories 
encompassed by the CIS were a “fundamental and vital interest” for Russia due to the 30 
million Russians, Russian speakers, and people culturally linked to Russia who live in 
those areas.208 Then deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin expressed similar 
sentiments at a 1994 conference, claiming that Russia could not abandon the interests of 
Russians abroad in places “which historically have always belonged to Russia.”209 
Moscow has extended this strategy to areas that are neither historically Russian nor 
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populated by Russians, but nonetheless share in a greater Slavic culture. Russia has 
exploited ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia to create fissures where its influence 
can be extended through Moscow’s alternative institutional model.210 Fueling ethnic 
conflict also contributes to Russia’s competition with the EU by impeding the ability of 
Balkan states to meet EU accession criteria or respond to Western democracy promotion 
efforts.211 
Ukraine is fertile ground for Russia to compete with the European Union on 
cultural and ethnic grounds. A 1995 study of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine found 
that 44 percent were in favor of the Ukrainian state developing “strong international ties 
with Russia.”212 A further 32 percent believed that the Donbas region should not be part 
of the Ukrainian state, favoring rather an autonomous region or unification with 
Russia.213 In Crimea, a preponderantly ethnic Russian region, a majority of residents 
identified themselves as “Soviet” rather than Ukrainian.214 Chapter IV undertakes a more 
detailed investigation of cultural identity and its role in political loyalty in Ukraine. 
Within Ukraine support for Ukrainian independence, the European Union, or Russia 
cannot be broken down purely along ethnic lines. Taken together, however, these 
attitudes and figures are suggestive of a high level of receptivity to Russian competition 
for influence on ethnic and cultural grounds.  
Russia has a steady trend of exploiting ethnic and cultural issues to extend its 
power in Ukraine. In 1995, the Russian Duma refused to ratify a friendship treaty with 
Ukraine negotiated by President Yeltsin, and was sharply critical of Yeltsin’s acceptance 
of Crimea’s status as Ukrainian territory. The treaty’s rejection is indicative of a 
longstanding spurning of Ukrainian political independence, even at a time when the 
Russian state was not powerful enough to exert any significant coercion.215 Russia 
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backed Yanukovych’s Party of Regions—the modern successor to the Ukrainian 
communist party—by supporting protests in Crimea against Ukrainian participation in 
NATO exercises.216 Yanukovych’s ouster in February 2014 was a major setback to 
Russia’s ability to gain advantage through pro-Russian factions within Ukraine’s political 
system, but also offered new motivation and opportunity to exploit ethnic and cultural 
issues.  
The historical and cultural ties of Crimea to Russia have been used as the main 
argument justifying the detachment of the peninsula from Ukraine and its annexation to 
Russia. In his speech concerning the annexation, Putin argued that Russia “was not 
simply robbed, it was plundered,” when Crimea was transferred to Ukraine by Nikita 
Khrushchev in 1954 and then allowed to remain part of Ukraine in 1991.217 Putin 
stressed that the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of 
whom almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly 
consider Russian their native language,” and that a referendum on Crimea’s future 
political status yielded 96 percent in favor of reunification with Russia.218 Russian 
competition strategy in this case is twofold. Russia is creating a narrative that its actions 
in Crimea are merely the rectification of a historical and cultural crime. The emphasis 
placed on the referendum reflects an effort to compete with the European Union on its 
own principles and lay claim to additional legitimacy based on the precedent that Russia 
believes was established in the Kosovo case.  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea secured the Black Sea Fleet base and a large 
Russian population, but compromised Moscow’s ability to exert control in the rest of 
Ukraine. The annexation removed a large sector of the pro-Russian electorate and 
provoked the formation of a political consensus opposed to Russian influence. The 
October 2014 parliamentary elections returned a solid majority committed to pro-
European agendas and threatened to move Ukraine out of Moscow’s sphere of influence 
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permanently.219 In conjunction with the military action described in the previous section, 
Russia has sought to employ ethnic and cultural manipulation to detach areas of interest 
from Ukraine and bring them under Russia’s influence. The areas targeted by Russia 
were referred to as “Novorossiya” by Putin on April 17th 2014, recalling the region’s 
name during the Tsarist period and implying that the territories legitimately belong in the 
Russia sphere. Philosopher, political scientist, and advisor to the Duma Aleksandr Dugin 
claimed Novorossiya would be “a holy place for a renaissance of Russian culture, 
Russian spirit, and Russian identity.”220 Official efforts to legitimize Russian claims have 
been made: maps of the territory of Novorossiya have been published in Moscow, and the 
Russian Academy of Sciences plans to publish an official history of Novorossiya.221 The 
strategic aim of the Novorossiya project is to establish an autonomous sub-region within 
a federalized Ukraine, dominated by a population that identifies politically, culturally, 
and ethnically with Russia.222 In addition to military support, the separatists in eastern 
Ukraine have received administrative support from professional bureaucrats that have 
achieved success in building the institutions of the breakaway, Russia-backed 
Transnistria region of Moldova. Self-described professionals, these bureaucrats have 
reportedly imported a constitution written by Moscow lawyers and are constructing 
internal security agencies to consolidate the ability of the separatists to defend “a right to 
live on their land, to speak the language they want.”223 If this strategy succeeds, Russia 
will have essentially established a protectorate in the Donbas, securing Moscow’s 
influence in the east. A federal Ukraine that includes a subunit with a strongly Russian 
character will also contribute to Moscow’s ability to continue to compete with the 
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European Union for Ukraine as a whole by enabling continued access to Kiev through 
Donbas proxies.224 
H. CONCLUSION 
Russia’s approach to competition over Ukraine is fundamentally different from 
that of the European Union. Russia demonstrated a consistent dedication to reassert 
exclusive, state-centric influence over Ukraine since Moscow lost political control of the 
country following the Soviet Union’s collapse. The preference for a traditional, 
sovereignty-based strategy of dominance over the European Union’s method of 
engagement, cooperation, and multilateralism stems from Russia’s preferred version of 
the European order. Russia has resisted embracing Western multilateral norms and has 
refused to acknowledge that Ukraine and other states in the post-Soviet space are 
legitimate subjects of EU attempts to advance such norms. In its relations with the 
European Union and other Western institutions such as NATO Russia has worked to 
derail programs that would improve transparency, deepen cooperation, and legitimize 
Western multilateral power arrangements. 
Russia’s motivations to compete for Ukraine are manifold. Ukraine figures highly 
in the national memory of Russians and its battlefields are an indelible part of the Russian 
identity. Although no longer part of the Soviet single market, Ukraine remains a state 
with major economic importance to Russia. Before 2014, there was a significant trade 
relationship between the two countries, especially in sensitive military technology. 
Ukraine is a vital link in Russia’s energy export infrastructure to Europe. The country is 
also important to Russian security strategy, both as a base to project power to Europe 
through the Black Sea Fleet and as a buffer to the expanded NATO alliance. Ukraine also 
hosts a large population of Russians and Russian speakers who look to Moscow for 
cultural and sometimes political leadership.  
Russia has used traditional and novel strategies to achieve its objective of 
securing exclusive influence over Ukraine. While Russia has sponsored international 
institutions such as the CIS to seemingly present an alternative to the European Union, 
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these institutions are chiefly aimed at allowing Moscow to exert influence through 
avenues other than direct bilateral relations. While Ukraine’s history of limited or 
nonexistent interaction with the CIS, the CSTO and the EEU show that this strategy has 
been less than successful for Russia, it is evident that Moscow’s aim has been to secure 
Kiev’s cooperation with Russian policies. Russia has consistently used energy as a tool to 
enforce its will, both by punishing Ukraine with higher prices or cutoffs and by enticing 
cooperation through special deals. When diplomatic and economic leverage has failed, 
Moscow has not hesitated to employ military force to advance its core interests. The 
Russian military was used in 2014 to seize Crimea, home of the Black Sea Fleet, and 
support a rebel insurgency in eastern Ukraine that has complicated the European Union’s 
efforts to carry cooperation with Ukraine any further. In concert with military action, 
Russia has also stepped up rhetorical and political support for ethnic Russians within the 
country, asserting the right to protect Russians outside its borders and demanding 
autonomy for areas of Ukraine heavily populated by Russians. 
In the wake of the seizure of Crimea, Russian strategy in Ukraine seems to have 
evolved. Rather than seek to influence the country as a whole, Russia appears to have 
settled for asserting firm control over the territories of greatest value to Moscow. Crimea 
was officially annexed to the Russian Federation. The Russian military has provided 
material support, and has at times engaged in combat, to prevent Kiev from defeating the 
pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s actions have strengthened pro-European 
Union elites in Kiev, removing—for the time being—the possibility of complete Russian 
hegemony. Yet Russia continues its competition with the EU by demanding the 
establishment of an autonomous region, through which it could stymie European Union-
led cooperation efforts through pro-Russian proxies. The events of since late 2013 have 
yielded both gains and setbacks for Moscow, yet the Russian strategy of seeking 
exclusive influence over Ukraine has remained unchanged. The objective of Russian 
competition over Ukraine, and the value placed on winning that competition by Moscow, 
have remained consistent—in contrast to the European Union’s slow growth of interest. 
Moscow will likely continue to seek ways to bolster Russian state power in Ukraine 
while derailing EU cooperation projects. 
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IV. ANALYZING THE COMPETITION IN UKRAINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters have undertaken a detailed consideration of European 
Union and Russian foreign policies with regard to competing for influence in Ukraine, 
and those strategies aimed at undermining or placating each other. This chapter considers 
how the attitudes and policies of Ukraine itself have shaped the competition between the 
EU and Russia. Ukraine’s relations with both these entities are complex and cannot be 
reduced to a friend or foe dichotomy. The complexity is driven by the diversity of 
approaches to identity within Ukraine itself, and by the realities of Ukraine’s geopolitical 
position. In terms of culture, economics, and geography, Ukraine is a crossroads between 
Europe and Russia.225  
A crossroads implies that a singular course must be chosen, yet such a decision is 
not easy for the Ukrainian state. Ukraine’s historically close association with Russia, both 
culturally and via centuries of political union, has created a potent incentive to maintain a 
strong relationship despite independence. The economic opportunities offered by the 
European Union, as well as the Ukrainian nationalists’ desire to develop a Ukrainian 
community distinct from Russia, create major internal pressures to engage with the 
powers of Europe.226 Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and the Russian 
Federation since independence reflect these diverging attractions. Kiev has sought a 
delicate balance—to maintain its longstanding ties with Russia while expanding relations 
with the European Union. The forces that support these initiatives are not strictly partisan 
in nature. Political leaders with a decidedly pro-European agenda, such as President 
Kuchma, have been careful to address Russian concerns. The staunchly Russia-friendly 
President Yanukovych demonstrated a sustained concern for Ukraine’s European 
opportunities. The groups and factions that make up the diverse identities of the 
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Ukrainian citizenry similarly have demonstrated complex attitudes toward the two 
choices offered at the crossroads. 
The competition between the European Union and Russia over Ukraine has been 
sustained by Kiev’s efforts to placate both sides. As neither Brussels nor Moscow was 
able to gain decisive advantage, each has continued—and in the case of the European 
Union, significantly transformed—its efforts to become the major external influence in 
Ukrainian affairs. The competition thus intensified until Ukraine was forced into a 
decision over an association agreement with the EU in November 2013. As of this 
writing in April 2015, Ukraine appears to have rejected participating in Russia’s Eurasian 
Economic Union project and to have committed to seeking closer ties with the European 
Union. This chapter will examine how domestic Ukrainian attitudes have shaped 
competition by the EU and Russia and, conversely, how the competition has shaped 
Ukraine’s policies. A brief survey of identity in Ukraine will be undertaken to illuminate 
the diverse groups within the country and their viewpoints on the European Union and 
Russia. The chapter will then show that Ukrainian foreign policy since independence has 
enmeshed the EU and Russia into competition with each other by seeking to engage with 
both powers. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Ukraine’s choice of the 
European Union in 2014. 
B. UKRAINIAN IDENTITIES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
RUSSIA 
Despite the short history of Ukrainian statehood, the idea of a Ukrainian identity 
separable and distinct—though culturally linked—with Russia is ancient. Ukraine claims 
Kievan Rus as its national origin just as Russia does. To Ukrainian nationalists, the 
Ukrainians are not an offshoot. In their view, the Ukrainian people are either the true 
inheritors of Rus’ legacy, or at least share an equal historical and cultural claim with the 
Great Russians.227 Ethnic Ukrainians have also developed historical ties to Europe 
independent of the Russian experience.  
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The western Ukrainian territory of Galicia has through the centuries been part of 
Austrian, Polish, and Czechoslovakian polities, creating an enduring connection to 
Europe.228 Evidence suggest that ethnic Ukrainians in Galicia and as far east as Kiev 
consider themselves as part of Europe due to these long standing connections.229 Western 
Ukrainian nationalists exhibit a high level of political organization, stemming from 
policies of autonomy practiced by localities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.230 
Nationalist Ukrainians strongly support ties with Europe as a means of assuring their 
independence from Russia and to assist in the development of a Ukrainian identity.231 A 
1997 survey of Ukrainian elites indicated 70% favored association with the European 
Union over Russia.232  
The forces of nationalism, however, have not managed to exert a decisive 
influence on Ukrainian foreign relations. The early political organization representing 
Ukrainian nationalism, the Rukh, was a major driving force behind Ukraine’s secession 
from the Soviet Union. Rukh, however, could not obtain more than a quarter of the seats 
in the Rada and was forced to strike a power-sharing “Grand Bargain” with Ukrainian 
communists who represented elements of the population opposed to nationalism and 
more strongly identified with a Russian cultural identity.233 As this chapter shows, the 
influence of Ukrainian nationalists on their government’s foreign policy has consistently 
been tempered by a need to maintain reasonably positive relations with Russia. 
In the eastern and southern territories of Ukraine, the population expresses a high 
level of identification with Russia culturally and linguistically, but rarely a form of 
Russian nationalism antithetical to Ukrainian independence.234 Those identifying 
strongly with Russia are not only ethnic Russians—of which a significant minority 
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exists—but also Russophone Ukrainians. Ethnic Russians in Ukraine prior to 2014 rarely 
manifested a tendency to favor separatism, and there is no evidence of ethnic conflict in 
Ukraine during its first decade of independence.235 A 1995 survey of Russian elites in 
Donetsk revealed a perceived lack of conflict between loyalty to Ukraine and 
identification with Russian culture.236 Ukrainian Russophones have a complex attitude 
toward foreign relations, exhibiting support for Ukraine’s political independence while 
also seeking to maintain cultural links with Russia.237 Ethnic Russians and Ukrainian 
Russophones alike have demonstrated attachment to a “Soviet” rather than Ukrainian or 
Russian allegiance.238 The segment of Ukraine’s population identifying itself as “Soviet” 
has never accepted Ukrainian or Russian nationalist rhetoric, preferring the perceived 
stability, prestige, and economic security that Ukraine enjoyed while it was a republic of 
the Soviet Union. Inherent in this identity is a belief that Ukraine and Russia should be a 
fundamentally connected unit.239 While favoring strong ties with Russia, this identity is 
not outright hostile to Ukrainian ties with Europe. Boris Oliinyk, a leader of the 
Ukrainian Communist party that embodies the Soviet identity within the country, claimed 
in 1994 that “we were always part of Europe.”240 Subsequently, Ukrainian Presidents 
from Kuchma to Poroshenko have maintained a formal engagement program with the 
European Union to facilitate closer cooperation. 
A Ukrainian ideological “center” also exists between European-leaning 
nationalists and Slavic-oriented ethnic Russians and Ukrainian Russophones. This space 
is not filled by an organized political faction, but rather by corporate interests and 
oligarchical business elites. These interests have been successful in obtaining political 
power due to the inability of nationalists to generate majority support, and the 
disorganization of Russian-oriented factions.241 The interests in the center are 
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opportunistic in nature and approach the European Union and Russia accordingly. Ethnic 
Ukrainian business elites in the east are supportive of ties with Russia due to their 
industrial concerns.242 A new class of Ukrainian capitalists has consistently supported a 
succession of political fronts in favor of trade relations with the West while remaining 
wary of nationalist rhetoric.243 The unaligned and opportunistic nature of these interests 
is well represented by the Ukrainian Green party, founded by an environmentalist but 
actually controlled by bankers “that bought the other places on the party’s list.”244 The 
transient nature of corporate political factions and their lack of strong affiliation with 
Ukraine’s right or left make the long term attitude of these factions toward Russia or the 
EU hard to pin down. Nonetheless, they are an ever present and influential part of the 
Ukrainian political scene. 
C. UKRAINE AND THE EU-RUSSIA COMPETITION PRIOR TO THE 
ORANGE REVOLUTION 
Ukraine began its modern history as an independent state with a turn away from 
Russia, and a series of actions to seek closer ties with Europe. The 1990 Ukrainian 
Declaration of State Sovereignty included language declaring Ukraine part of Europe, 
stating that Ukraine “directly participates in the general European process and European 
structures.”245 In a referendum on independence held December 1, 1991, all regions of 
Ukraine, including the east and Crimea, voted in favor. The high level of support for 
separation from Russia elicited surprise in many quarters, including Russian leader Boris 
Yeltsin, who remarked “What, even the Donbass voted yes?”—referring to the region 
now engaged in armed revolt against the Kiev government.246 Since gaining 
independence, the Ukrainian government has pursued a consistent strategy of making 
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good on its claim to be a European state by building and expanding links to the European 
Union.  
In the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections, incumbent Leonid Kravchuk was 
defeated by Leonid Kuchma. Despite Kuchma’s political affiliations—he won every 
oblast in the Russia-oriented east while Kravchuk swept the pro-European west—the 
Ukrainian government undertook its first major expansion of relations with the EU in the 
form of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The Ukrainian impetus 
behind the agreement was to seek improved economic cooperation with the EU and an 
eventual free trade agreement.247 Regardless of the cultural affinity felt for Russia by the 
Kuchma administration, a high value was placed on the ability to pursue economic 
growth independent of Russia that the EU represented. During this period the Kuchma 
administration also formed the GUAM organization as a means to establish an alternative 
economic bloc to the CIS within the post-Soviet space that would be more compatible for 
cooperation with the EU.248 A Ukraine-EU common strategy was published in 1999, 
representing continued interest in expanding cooperation, but amounting to little tangible 
change.249 
As described in Chapter II, the process of expanding Ukrainian-EU relations in 
this period was slow due to the lack of interest demonstrated by Brussels. Ukraine, 
however, also bears significant responsibility for the plodding pace of diplomacy due to 
its continued interest in maintaining positive relations with the Russian Federation. There 
is no evidence of a strong Ukrainian political constituency advocating vigorously 
expanding cooperation with the EU at Russia’s expense as a primary interest. Diplomacy 
with the EU was conducted via presidential fiat, economically motivated, and pursued 
with Russia’s sensibilities in mind.250 Indeed, concurrently with efforts to establish 
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improved cooperation with the EU, Kiev also sought to maintain constructive relations 
with Russia.  
While Ukrainian independence had gathered majority support in both the east and 
the west, the country did not seek to abandon association with the new Russian 
Federation. In his 1994 presidential inauguration address, Kuchma affirmed that “Ukraine 
is historically part of the Eurasian economic and cultural space.”251 Ukraine’s long 
standing status as a part of a single economic market within the Soviet Union, and even 
earlier, the Russian Empire, was a major driver for Kiev’s continued engagement with 
Moscow. Ukraine’s membership and participation in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States were primarily motivated by the need to mitigate the economic impact of the loss 
of the Soviet market.252 In the energy sector Ukrainian corporate oligarchs are heavily 
vested in stable relations with Russia to maintain the extant energy infrastructure that 
their livelihood depends on.253  
Aside from the economic requirements of close cooperation with Russia, a strong 
political constituency demanded continued engagement. From independence in 1991 until 
2001, the Ukrainian Communist Party, which represented the majority of ethnic Russians 
and Ukrainian Russophones within Ukraine, was the largest organized political 
faction.254 A central policy of the Communist platform was “the voluntary creation of an 
equal Union of fraternal peoples on the territory of the former USSR.”255 This policy 
expressed strong support for deepening political ties with Russia. Ukrainian elites are at 
least partially responsible for the government’s slow pace in developing relations with the 
European Union due to their acute awareness of the need to maintain a strategic 
partnership with Russia.256 Russia, while maintaining an ambition to exercise exclusive 
influence over Ukraine, had difficulty pursuing its aims due to the disruption and 
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weakness experienced following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the new millennium, 
Ukraine’s attempt to walk a tightrope between Brussels and Moscow escalated the 
competition as a resurgent Russia faced an increasingly engaged European Union. 
D. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION, ENP AND EAP 
The events of the Orange Revolution, and the subsequent escalation in the 
competition between the EU and Russia, are linked to Ukraine’s continued polices of 
courting both powers. The domestic forces behind the Orange Revolution itself were 
formed in response to a machinated victory by Yanukovych in the 2004 presidential 
election. The scheme was supported by outgoing President Kuchma, who supported 
Yanukovych due to a perceived need to maintain a balanced relationship with 
Moscow.257 The outrage at the corrupt electoral process strengthened the pro-EU forces 
within Ukraine and drew the European Union itself into deeper engagement. At the 
height of the Orange Revolution, 55% of surveyed Ukrainians expressed support for 
closer ties with the European Union.258 In the previous decade, only a quarter of the 
population could be counted among the pro-West faction.259 The European Union 
became directly involved in Ukrainian politics for the first time, dispatching negotiators 
to help mediate the agreement that eventually resulted in the election of pro-Western 
candidate Viktor Yuschenko.260 Under Yuschenko, Ukraine’s involvement in the EU-
Russia competition intensified. The new government’s policies domestically downgraded 
the status of the Russian language and culture.261 Internationally, Kiev stepped up 
participation in the EU’s new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Ukraine and the EU 
agreed on an ENP Action Plan (AP) despite the lack of any major incentive to do so for 
Kiev.262 The Yuschenko administration aligned with the EU on the controversial 
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Transnistria issue, opposing Russian interests.263 Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the 
Ukrainian pro-Russia faction, announced support for pursuing relations with the 
European Union as well. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, his Party of Regions 
was officially in favor of pursuing closer economic cooperation with the EU, and argued 
that its obstruction to enacting the ENP AP was undertaken in order to obtain better terms 
for Ukraine.264  
Demands for closer association with the European Union by multiple factions 
within Ukraine revealed that the ENP was an inadequate mechanism.265 The creation of 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) by the EU was prompted in part by Ukraine’s interest in a 
more robust framework, including specific incentives such as a visa protocol and a free 
trade agreement. Even after the election of Yanukovych to the Presidency in 2010, efforts 
to deepen cooperation with the EU continued. Upon assuming power Yanukovych 
announced that ““Ukraine’s integration with the EU remains our strategic aim.”266 A 
November 2010 summit in Brussels between EU leaders and Yanukovych resulted in an 
agreement to establish an EU Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) for Ukraine.267 Ukraine’s continued expression of 
interest in the EU, even during the rule of an ostensibly pro-Russian administration, 
committed Brussels even further to competition for influence in the country. The ENP, 
EaP, and pledge to a DCFTA represented major investments by the EU. In combination 
with the moral and political investment made by vocal EU support for the Orange 
Revolution, these developments contributed to the EU’s growing stake in Ukraine. 
The dramatic events of the Orange Revolution would seem to indicate a decisive 
turn toward the European Union and away from Russia by Ukraine. While the reputation 
of the European Union did indeed enjoy increased popularity in Ukrainian society and 
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ties between Kiev and Brussels began to deepen, Ukraine continued to carefully maintain 
open channels with Moscow. As the tide of emotional pro-Western sentiment that buoyed 
the Orange Revolution receded, political forces favoring Russia reemerged. During the 
Orange Revolution, the disintegration of the Communist Party had left ethnic Russians 
and other Russia-oriented Ukrainians politically disorganized.268 In subsequent years, 
Victor Yanukovych’s faction, the Party of Regions, emphasized a pro-Russian agenda 
and anti-NATO rhetoric to mobilize this fallow base of support.269 The Party of Regions 
opposition to adopting the ENP Action Plan contributed to the elimination of a 
government office dedicated to overseeing the project after only a year of existence.270 
Furthermore, discussion within the Ukrainian Rada was reopened on membership in the 
Russian Common Economic Space, a Moscow-led alternative integration project.271 
Following Yanukovych’s election to the presidency in 2010, the Ukrainian 
government’s foreign policy continued to entertain Moscow’s efforts to compete for 
influence, alongside participating in the EU’s EaP. In 2010 the Yanukovych 
administration reaffirmed Ukraine’s interest in the Common Economic Space and in 
Ukrainian membership in the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan (BRK) Customs Union.272 The 
pace of participation in the EaP slowed drastically and the Rada passed a law declaring 
Ukraine an officially nonaligned state.273 Ukraine’s continued flirtation with increased 
institutionalized economic cooperation with Russia helped keep its participation a central 
objective in Moscow’s Eurasian Economic Union project. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the Association Agreement due to be signed between the EU and Ukraine in 
November 2013 deeply threatened Russia’s longstanding diplomatic strategy toward 
Ukraine. Roy Allison described the consequent escalation of competition by Moscow: 
“As the domestic Ukrainian political crisis mounted in late 2013, Putin stepped up efforts 
to stake out not just an economic, political, or strategic division but a normative division, 
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requiring states to choose between EU-centered and Russia-centered integration.”274 
Yanukovych, perhaps sensing that embracing the EU agreement would badly damage 
Ukraine’s carefully maintained relations with Russia, abruptly abandoned the deal, 
accepting a large Russian loan and other perks, including an energy discount, in its 
stead.275 This maneuver, however, proved a tipping point in the competition.  
E. AN END TO THE BALANCING ACT 
Ukrainian engagement with both the EU and Russia since independence had 
ensured that each power had a sizeable stake in emerging as Kiev’s main partner. The 
intensification of competition between Moscow and Brussels sustained and deepened 
each power’s efforts to bring Ukraine into its economic system and international 
alignment. The legal incompatibility of the two systems and Russia’s perception of the 
competition as a zero sum game demanded that a choice be made. Yanukovych’s sudden 
cancellation of the laboriously negotiated EU association agreement proved to be the 
trigger that decisively ended Ukraine’s careful balancing and transformed Kiev’s foreign 
policy to an enthusiastic embrace of the EU and a rejection of Russia’s designs for 
Ukrainian membership in the EEU. 
Yanukovych’s decision triggered immediate and robust political opposition from 
Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Europe factions of the political and managerial class. The 
rise of pro-Europe sentiment was so powerful that Yanukovych evidently saw no 
prospect of preserving his position and chose to flee the country in February 2014 rather 
than see through to conclusion the negotiations with the opposition factions. There was 
little doubt that the new Ukrainian government would have reversed course and pursued 
the association agreement with the European Union. Russia, however, ensured that Kiev 
would chart a strictly pro-EU course by occupying Crimea days after Yanukovych left 
the country. Ukraine’s foreign policy unequivocally turned away from Russia and 
embraced the EU. On March 5th 2014, the Rada introduced legislation to repeal 
Ukraine’s non-aligned status and declare NATO membership a central tenet of its 
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national security strategy, an unambiguous rejection of Russian interests.276 In June 
2014, Ukraine’s new President, Petro Poroshenko, formally signed the EU Association 
Agreement, officially committing Ukraine to deepened cooperation with the European 
Union.277  
Ukraine’s first full scale round of elections following Yanukovych’s withdrawal 
from power resulted in a resounding victory for pro-European factions. Poroshenko’s 
faction, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, secured the greatest share of the vote, followed by 
the People’s Front party of pro-independence politician Arseny Yatseniuk (who was 
serving as Prime Minister), and another pro-European party, the nationalist Self Reliance 
party, was third.278 The landslide victory for pro-European forces was undoubtedly aided 
by the fact that the regions of Ukraine most likely to return Russia-oriented candidates 
did not participate in the election—Crimea because of its annexation by Russia, and the 
Donbass due to the Russian-sponsored separatists controlling the region rather than the 
Kiev government.  
Ukraine’s dramatic realignment toward the European Union can thus be attributed 
to Russia twice over. Any economic incentives Ukrainian nationalists had to maintain 
relations with Russia were erased by Moscow’s seizure of Crimea and support for the 
armed revolt against the government. Those same Russian actions, meanwhile, removed 
the faction naturally inclined to support maintaining strong ties with Russia from the 
polity. There is, however, evidence that Russia’s aggressive behavior has disillusioned 
non-nationalist Russophone Ukrainians as well. Local coalitions of Russophones in east 
Ukraine outside of the Donbas have cooperated with Kiev’s efforts to maintain control of 
the region, and the results of the October 2014 election seem to indicate a consensus 
between these factions and western nationalists determined to defend Ukrainian 
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independence and resist Russian influence.279 Further time and study are necessary to 
determine the strength of this consensus and its prospects for long term endurance. 
The confirmation of a domestic consensus supporting Ukraine’s ambition to join 
the European Union ensured the continuation of pro-Western policies. Poroshenko 
reiterated Ukraine’s interest in joining NATO in November 2014, announcing plans to 
hold a referendum on seeking membership in the alliance.280 At the December 2014 
ratification ceremony of the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement in Warsaw, 
Poroshenko announced a reform program aimed at preparing Ukraine to join the 
European Union by 2020.281 He has actively engaged EU heads of state and government, 
and the European Council throughout the crisis, seeking support and reaffirming 
Ukraine’s commitment to the European Union.  
As a result of the changes in domestic Ukrainian politics, Moscow has 
transformed Russian strategy in the competition. Russia apparently recognized that its 
previous objective of exercising dominant influence over the Ukrainian government had 
moved out of reach. Putin officially burned all remaining political bridges between 
Moscow and Kiev, announcing that all bilateral agreements between the two countries 
were voided by the supposed coup against Yanukovych.282 Aware that the new 
government in Kiev is staunchly committed to the EU—and unlike previous Ukrainian 
regimes, comparatively free of domestic political divisions capable of being exploited by 
Moscow—Russia now seeks instead to constrain Ukraine’s strategic options by creating a 
frozen conflict. At the September 2014 Minsk peace summit Russia demanded a 
federalized Ukraine, with significant autonomy for the separatist-controlled eastern 
region.283 Moscow’s objective for this arrangement is to deny the pro-EU government in 
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Kiev the ability to control the entirety of its territory, make Ukrainian membership in the 
EU impossible through the creation of an autonomous federal unit permanently opposed 
to membership, and gain Russia limited influence over the whole country through proxies 
elected from the Donbass.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The diverse identities and interests of Ukraine’s population have guided the 
country to conduct pragmatic diplomacy with the European Union and Russia, seeking 
close and productive ties with both yet committing to neither. Ukraine’s foreign policy in 
turn shaped the competitive strategies of Brussels and Moscow. The EU and Russia both 
sought to bring Ukraine into their respective political and economic systems. Inevitably, 
the competition escalated to the point that circumstances demanded a decisive choice. 
The crisis beginning in November 2013 has resulted in a fundamental shift in Ukraine’s 
role in the competition between the EU and Russia, and in the competition itself. Ukraine 
has forged a pro-Western political consensus and announced its unreserved interest in 
joining the European Union. Russia has given up on its previous strategy of bringing 
Ukraine as a whole into its sphere of influence and has instead seized control of its vital 
interests in the country, either directly or via support for separatist proxies. Specific 
policies resulting from the Ukrainian pro-EU consensus have yet to manifest themselves 
at the time of this writing. It is also as yet unclear how successful Russia will be in 
seeking to stymie Ukrainian aspirations to integrate with the EU. It is certain, however, 
that Ukraine’s role in the competition has changed, and that a return to the balanced and 
pragmatic policies of the past is no longer an option. 
 75
V. CONCLUSION 
The territory that comprises modern Ukraine has been the object of many 
competitions throughout history. Long considered the birthplace of Russian civilization 
and often within the Russian polity, parts of the land also saw rule by the Mongols, the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary before the 
emergence of an enduring Ukrainian state. A distinct Ukrainian identity claims status and 
historical standing equal to that of Russia, but only recently has Ukraine achieved 
political autonomy.  
Ukraine’s first two and a half decades of independence from Russia have led the 
strongest partisans of Ukrainian nationalism to seek closer ties with the European Union. 
The European Union’s decades of enlargement and outreach have brought its eastern 
edge to the borders of Ukraine, inevitably making the country an object of interest and 
opportunity to Brussels. Despite Ukraine’s independence, however, the country’s 
population cannot be considered unified in its cultural or political identity. Significant 
swaths of the Ukrainian citizenry, especially in the eastern regions, maintain strong ties to 
Russia and show little affinity for the European Union. Russia, meanwhile, has never lost 
interest in Ukraine, regarding it as a key part of Russia’s own identity, a strategic asset in 
military and geographic terms, and an essential element in Moscow’s plans to exert 
regional economic and political domination.  
The European Union’s 2003 European Security Strategy asserted an aspiration to 
create a “ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union.”284 In 
pursuit of this goal, the EU has structured its diplomacy to encourage its neighbors, 
including Ukraine, to adopt the EU’s political norms and its legal structure, the acquis 
communautaire. Russia, however, has spurned participation in EU engagement programs 
and has sought to build a regional sphere of influence in which power emanates from 
Moscow. Russia has asserted various interests in Ukraine, but its geopolitical ambitions 
are the prime drivers behind the competition for influence in the country. Since Ukraine’s 
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attainment of independence in 1991, these dynamics have driven the European Union 
toward steadily intensifying competition with the Russian Federation over which power 
will have greater influence in Kiev. 
Ukraine’s position as a state bordering the eastern-most members of the European 
Union demands consideration by Brussels in the formulation of EU foreign policy. 
Ukraine, situated directly between the EU and Russia, figures importantly in the EU’s 
strategy of creating stable, liberal states on its periphery to insulate the core from security 
risks. The successful installation of enduring liberal norms in Ukraine would validate the 
credibility of the EU’s soft power and its multilateral diplomacy. The EU also has 
growing economic interests in Ukraine, especially in the realm of energy. Over time, 
these interests have drawn the EU into seeking ever deeper cooperation with Ukraine. 
EU-Ukrainian relations had an inauspicious start, but have grown steadily over 
the decades. After Ukraine gained independence, the EU had no official delegation to the 
country for over two years. However, since the establishment of relations in 1993, the EU 
has committed to the implementation of ever deeper formalized programs of cooperation. 
This cooperation has taken many forms: the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 
1994, the European Neighborhood Program in 2004, the Eastern Partnership in 2009, and 
the culmination to date: the Association Agreement signed in 2014. The 2014 
Association Agreement concluded by Ukraine and the EU is especially significant 
considering that it took place in the context of an ongoing, active military intervention in 
Ukraine by Russia. 
The European Union has not always been aware of its role as a participant in a 
competition with Russia. As this thesis has shown, early EU diplomacy with Ukraine was 
characterized by a “take it or leave it” approach—hardly the mark of an aggressive 
courtship. When the prospect of competition with Russia was raised, it often served to 
dampen Brussels’ enthusiasm for deepening ties with Ukraine. Yet as the European 
Union’s relations with, and investment in, Ukraine have expanded, it has become more 
willing to overtly compete with Russia for influence. Since the beginning of the Ukraine 
crisis in November 2013, the European Union’s diplomatic communiques have 
repeatedly condemned Russia’s behavior, and the 28 member states have leveled several 
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rounds of punitive sanctions. There has been a marked shift in the attitudes of EU elites 
toward Russia as a result of the crisis. Once Moscow was a strategic partner, but it is now 
a strategic problem. 
Russia, on the other hand, has demonstrated a steady strategic commitment to 
securing Ukraine within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Moscow has consistently sought 
to use Russian-dominated international institutions to encourage Kiev to adopt policies 
favorable to Russia, and Moscow has a demonstrable track record of manipulating energy 
policies to strong arm Ukraine into aligning with Russian interests. The events following 
the European Union’s November 2013 Vilnius Summit make Russia’s commitment to its 
strategic goals in Ukraine evident: when economic and energy incentives failed to ensure 
a pro-Moscow government in Kiev, Russia escalated its tactics to active armed 
intervention. 
Since its attainment of independence, Ukraine has not been a passive pawn in the 
competition between Brussels and Moscow. Ukrainian political and cultural identities 
and economic realities within the country have historically driven Kiev to seek 
cooperation with both the EU and Russia, and to attempt to avoid antagonizing either. 
Seeking membership in the European Union was the official policy of the Kuchma, 
Yuschenko, and Yanukovych presidencies. Ukraine’s foreign policy during this period 
also demonstrated an awareness of the importance of Russian trade, and especially 
Russian energy resources, and until the 2013 crisis avoided irrevocably damaging 
relations with Moscow. Yanukovych’s abrupt withdrawal at the EU’s Vilnius summit 
was driven in part by the fact that Moscow made clear to him that signing an Association 
Agreement with the EU would constitute an unacceptable challenge to Russian interests. 
Yanukovych’s February 2014 decision to flee the country, thereby leaving Ukraine in the 
hands of pro-Western domestic forces, began a new phase for Ukraine’s role in the 
competition between the EU and Russia. As shown in this thesis, Kiev has firmly aligned 
with the European Union and is now engaged in a conflict with separatists acting as 
proxies for Russia in the east of the country. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has 
openly rejected Russia’s strategy to pursue its interests through separatist proxies in an 
autonomous Donbass, announcing in April 2015 that “Federalization is like an infection, 
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a biological weapon which they are trying to impose from outside Ukraine . . . we will 
not allow it.”285 
The growth of the European Union’s efforts to compete for influence in Ukraine 
has clashed directly with Russia’s longstanding dedication to securing Kiev within its 
sphere of influence. During the crisis since 2013, the European Union has demonstrated a 
willingness to directly oppose Russian actions, diplomatically condemning Moscow and 
enacting an escalating series of sanctions, which remain in place. As the European 
Union’s level of competition with Russia has increased, the competition itself has been 
transformed. Ukraine has committed itself to the EU’s camp and has ended its efforts to 
maintain a balance between Brussels and Moscow. Russia’s strategy has been 
transformed as well. The strategy to bring Ukraine within Russian-dominated systems 
such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU) has been placed on hold. Moscow now acts to defend limited core interests 
such as its Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, and to deny Ukraine to the EU by demanding that 
Kiev enact political reforms that would empower separatists in east Ukraine—separatists 
that are controlled by Moscow. 
The current high level of competition between the European Union and Russia is 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. A series of peace protocol meetings in Minsk 
has failed to resolve the Ukraine conflict. In the deliberations for a new peace agreement, 
on 11 February 2015, Russia continued to demand a reformed, decentralized government 
that would politically empower pro-Russian separatists—an obvious continuation of 
Russia’s new competitive strategy.286 Perhaps emboldened by the U.S. rhetoric of a 
“pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, and the economic instability within the Eurozone, Russia is 
unlikely to give up pursuit of its interests in Ukraine or to make strategic concessions to 
the European Union. None of the peace agreements has succeeded in ending the fighting 
in Ukraine’s civil war. The European Union appears committed to supporting Ukrainian 
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sovereignty and opposing Russia’s intervention. While still unwilling to extend an 
invitation of EU membership to Ukraine, Brussels nonetheless has taken significant steps 
to cooperate with Kiev to resist Moscow, as shown in Chapter II of this thesis. As 
recently as May 10, 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel, who often serves as a de facto 
negotiator for the European Union, called the annexation of Crimea “criminal and illegal, 
under international law,” while speaking at a ceremony commemorating the anniversary 
of the end of the Second World War in Moscow.287 The EU is revising its overall 
competitive strategy as well. In March 2015 the European Commission released a paper 
acknowledging the “shortcomings” of the European Neighborhood Policy and calling for 
the policy to be restructured to better appeal to the European Union’s neighbors in the 
face of competing challenges.288 
Ukraine has become a battleground in a greater debate over which norms will 
prevail in the European—and global—security environment. At stake are the liberal 
norms of democracy, multilateralism, partnership, and the rule of law that the EU is 
founded upon. Russia seems to have abandoned these principles in the Ukraine case, 
although it had promised to respect them under the Helsinki Final Act and the Budapest 
Memorandum. The growth of the European Union’s commitment to compete with Russia 
over Ukraine indicates that the EU is willing to defend these values. It is more evident 
now than ever before that there is a deepening competition between the European Union 
and Russia, with Ukraine at the center. 
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